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Abstract 
The University of Liverpool 
Master of Philiosophy 
Risk-informed Safety Margin Characterization for 
A Large Break Loss-of-coolant Accident of Nuclear Power Plants and Associated 
Peak Cladding Temperature Margin Evolution 
Ting-Huai Liang 
The evaluation of methodology for large break loss of coolant accident (LBLOCA) 
licensing analysis involves two kinds of methodologies, namely deterministic methodology and 
risk-informed methodology. In the deterministic methodologies required for design-basis 
LBLOCA analysis, only epistemic or calculation uncertainty is addressed by either the 
conservative appendix K approach or the BEPU approach. Calculation uncertainty generally 
consists of physical model uncertainty and plant status uncertainty. In the risk-informed 
methodology, not only the epistemic uncertainty but also the aleatory are addressed by 
conducting a peak cladding temperature (PCT) load spectrum of LBLOCA. 
According to the existing 10 CFR50.46, LBLOCA is one of the most essential design-
basis accidents (DBA) and a deterministic methodology shall be applied to perform LBLOCA 
analysis based on a so-called surrogate sequence. Without considering how low this sequence 
occurrence probability is, this surrogate sequence satisfies all the required licensing 
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assumptions. However, in the to-be-issued 10 CFR 50.46a, the LBLOCA will be categorized 
as accidents beyond design basis and the peak cladding temperature margin shall be evaluated 
in a risk-informed manner. According to the risk-informed safety margin characterization 
methodology (RISMC), a process has been suggested to evaluate the risk-informed PCT margin. 
Following the RISMC methodology, a load spectrum of peak cladding temperature for 
LBLOCA has been generated for the Taiwan’s Maanshan Nuclear Power plant and 14 
probabilistic significant sequences have been identified. It was observed in the load spectrum 
that the conditional PCT generally ascends with the descending sequence occurrence 
probability. With the load spectrum covering both aleatory and epistemic uncertainties, the risk-
informed PCT margin can be evaluated by either expecting value estimation method or 
sequence probability coverage method. It was found that by comparing with the traditional 
deterministic methodology, the PCT margin evaluated by the RISMC methodology can be 
enlarged by 38.3-42.6 K. Besides, to have a cumulated occurrence probability over 99% in the 
load spectrum, the occurrence probability of the sequence referred is about 5.07*10-3, whereas 
for the traditional surrogate or licensing sequence generally applied in the deterministic 
methodology, the occurrence probability is only about 5.46*10-5. 
 Finally, observed from the evolution of LBLOCA methodologies, the safety margin of a  
LBLOCA can be released from traditional Appendix K methodology by (i) relaxing plant 
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bounding state assumption (DRHM), (ii) performing realistic LOCA analysis with statistical 
consideration of both model uncertainties and plant status uncertainties (BEPU), and (iii) 
relaxing licensing sequence assumption and evaluating the peak cladding temperature margin 
in a proper risk-informed manner (RISMC). 
 
Key words: PCT margin, Deterministic, Best-estimate, Uncertainties, Risk-informed, 
Licensing sequence, Load spectrum 
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Chapter 1. Preface 
For general design basis accidents (DBA), such as Small Break Loss of Coolant 
Accident (SBLOCA) and Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident (LBLOCA), the 
traditional deterministic safety analysis methodologies are always applied to analyze 
events based on a so called surrogate or licensing sequence, without considering how 
low this sequence occurrence probability is. In the traditional deterministic licensing 
safety analysis for DBA events, epistemic or calculation uncertainty which involves 
both model uncertainty and plant status uncertainty, also needs to be considered bases 
on the chosen surrogate sequence. According to the 10 CFR50.46
 
(USNRC, 1988), two 
kinds of deterministic methodologies are accepted for design-basis LBLOCA licensing 
analysis, namely conservative Appendix K methodology (USNRC, 1974) and best-
estimate plus uncertainty quantification (BEPU) methodology (Boyack, 1989). Before 
1988, only the conservative Appendix K methodology was allowed to perform the 
LBLOCA licensing analysis. Whereas, in the revised 10 CFR 50.46, BEPU 
methodology has been allowed and regulatory guide 1.157 (USNRC, 1989) clearly 
states how to quantify associated calculation uncertainty. Although BEPU methodology 
is legally allowed to replace the conservative Appendix K methodology, it is still a 
revised deterministic methodology based on a predetermined licensing sequence. In the 
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current advanced commercial BEPU licensing safety analysis methodologies 
(Westinghouse, 2005) (Martin, R.P., 2005) (Framatome ANP, 2001), only epistemic 
uncertainty is considered which involves both best-estimate mechanistic models and 
realistic plan status parameters. 
Regarding the deterministic LBLOCA methodologies, the peak cladding 
temperature (PCT) margin quantified by the traditional appendix K methodology with 
conservative appendix K models and bounding plant parameters can be enlarged by 
41.5 K (Chou, 2014) with the deterministic-realistic hybrid methodology (DRHM), in 
which conservative Appendix K models and realistic plant parameters are utilized. It 
was noted that the PCT margin released by realistic plant parameters can be about 1/4-
1/5 of the margin generated by a full-scoped BEPU methodology with both best-
estimate models and realistic plant parameters.  
However, according to the to-be-issued 10 CFR 50.46a (USNRC, 2010a), 
“alternative acceptance criteria for emergency core cooling systems for light water 
nuclear power reactors,” any Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) with a break size 
greater than the transition break size (USNRC, 2010b) can be considered as an accident 
beyond the design basis. As stated in paragraph (e) (3) of the to-be-issued10 CFR 
50.46a, calculations for LBLOCA may take credit for the availability of offsite power 
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and do not require the assumption of a single failure. Moreover, realistic initial 
conditions and the availability of non-safety-related equipment may be assumed if 
supported by plant-specific data or analysis. As also stated in the to-be-issued 10 CFR 
50.46a, any applicant, permit holder, or licensee or other entity who wishes to make 
changes enabled by this new rule, to the facility, facility design, or procedures or to the 
technical specifications shall perform a risk-informed safety margin evaluation. As 
required, when evaluating the risk-informed safety margin, the uncertainties considered 
should include phenomenology, modeling, plant construction, plant operation, etc. 
(USNRC, 2010c). Therefore, the risk-informed safety margin refers to a view of the 
margin based on a broader perspective than the safety margin determined by traditional 
deterministic LOCA methodologies. According to the proposed 10 CFR 50.46a, 
statements about the margin should have meaning not only with respect to a design-
basis event sequence, but more generally with reference to a group of success sequences, 
as shown in Figure 1-1. 
In the to-be-issued 10 CFR 50.46a, the LBLOCA will be categorized as accidents 
beyond design basis and the PCT margin shall be evaluated in a risk-informed manner. 
In a risk-informed methodology, a probabilistic load spectrum of PCT needs to be 
conducted, as shown in Figure 1-2, to evaluate the risk-informed PCT margin. With the 
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load spectrum covering both aleatory and epistemic uncertainties, the contribution of 
the PCT margin from all success sequences can be considered to be either weighted by 
the sequence occurrence probability, or evaluated by the sequence probability coverage 
(Liang, 2016). 
In this work, according to the risk-informed safety margin characterization 
(RISMC) methodology, a process has been suggested to evaluate the risk-informed 
PCT margin. Following the RISMC methodology, a load spectrum of PCT for 
LBLOCA has been generated for the Taiwan’s Maanshan Nuclear Power plant and 14 
probabilistic significant sequences have been identified. It was observed in the load 
spectrum that the conditional PCT generally ascends with the descending sequence 
occurrence probability. It was also found that by comparing with the traditional 
deterministic methodology, the PCT margin evaluated by the RISMC methodology can 
be greater by 38-43 K. Besides, to have a cumulated occurrence probability over 99% 
in the load spectrum, the occurrence probability of the sequence referred is about 
5.07*10-3, whereas for the traditional surrogate or licensing sequence generally applied 
in the deterministic methodology, the occurrence probability is only about 5.46*10-5. 
Finally, the evaluation of methodologies, from conservative Appendix K, best-estimate 
plus uncertainty quantification to risk-informed safety margin characterization, for a 
5 
 
 
 
LBLOCA licensing analysis will be addressed and discussed, and the PCT margin 
enlarged by different methodologies will be compared. 
 
 
Figure 1-1. Deterministic Approach versus Risk-informed Approach (IAEA, 2008) 
 
 
Figure 1-2. Load Spectrum (Hess, 2009)  
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Chapter 2. Traditional Methodologies for Safety Analysis 
Traditionally, there are two kinds of methodologies involved for reactor safety 
analysis, namely deterministic methodologies and probabilistic methodology. 
Currently, deterministic methodology is applied to perform licensing analysis of design 
basis accidents listed in Chapter 15 of Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) of nuclear 
power plants. While probabilistic methodology is applied to quantify failure rate of 
nuclear system, such as core damage frequency (CDF) or large early release frequency 
(LERF), with event tree and fault tree analysis techniques. In this chapter, the traditional 
deterministic licensing safety analysis for LBLOCA and Traditional Probabilistic 
Safety Assessment (PSA) analysis will be introduced separately in the following 
sections. 
 
7 
 
 
 
2.1 Deterministic licensing safety analysis for LBLOCA 
Regarding the deterministic methodology, evaluation of safety of a DBA can only 
be performed based on a surrogate sequence to satisfy all the licensing assumption 
requirements, such as single failure criteria, no credit taken for non-safety systems and 
loss of off-site power, etc. Although the occurrence probability of such a licensing 
sequence can be very low, it does satisfy all the required licensing assumptions for a 
DBA safety analysis. And the design safety margin can only be defined by the 
difference between safety limit and the calculated figure of merit based on proper 
deterministic licensing methodology. 
In the traditional deterministic licensing safety analysis for DBA events, only 
epistemic or calculation uncertainty which involves both model uncertainty and plant 
status uncertainty, needs to be considered based on the chosen surrogate sequence. 
According to the 10 CFR50.46 (USNRC, 1988), two kinds of deterministic 
methodologies are accepted for design-basis LBLOCA licensing analysis, namely 
conservative Appendix K methodology (USNRC, 1974) and best-estimate plus 
uncertainty quantification (BEPU) methodology (Boyack, 1989). Before 1988, only the 
conservative Appendix K methodology was allowed to perform the LBLOCA licensing 
analysis. Whereas, in the revised 10 CFR 50.46, BEPU methodology has been allowed 
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and regulatory guide 1.157 (USNRC, 1989) clearly states how to quantify associated 
calculation uncertainty. The historical prospective of LBLOCA regulation is stated in 
Table 2-1. 
Although the BEPU methodology is legally allowed to replace the conservative 
Appendix K methodology, it is still a revised deterministic methodology based on a 
predetermined licensing sequence. In the current advanced commercial BEPU licensing 
safety analysis methodologies (Westinghouse, 2005) (Martin, R.P., 2005) (Framatome 
ANP, 2001), only epistemic uncertainty is considered which involves both best-
estimate mechanistic models and realistic plan status parameters. 
The LOCA analytical results with licensing methodologies of either deterministic 
or risk-informed approaches shall all satisfy the acceptance criteria for emergency core 
cooling systems for light water nuclear reactors. Those associated acceptance criteria 
involve； 
(1) Peak cladding temperature  
The calculated maximum fuel element cladding temperature shall not exceed 
2200° F. 
(2) Maximum cladding oxidation 
The calculated total oxidation of the cladding shall nowhere exceed 0.17 times the 
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total cladding thickness before oxidation. As used in this subparagraph total 
oxidation means the total thickness of cladding metal that would be locally 
converted to oxide if all the oxygen absorbed by and reacted with the cladding 
locally were converted to stoichiometric zirconium dioxide. If cladding rupture is 
calculated to occur, the inside surfaces of the cladding shall be included in the 
oxidation, beginning at the calculated time of rupture. Cladding thickness before 
oxidation means the radial distance from inside to outside the cladding, after any 
calculated rupture or swelling has occurred but before significant oxidation.  
(3) Maximum hydrogen generation 
The calculated total amount of hydrogen generated from the chemical reaction of 
the cladding with water or steam shall not exceed 0.01 times the hypothetical 
amount that would be generated if all of the metal in the cladding cylinders 
surrounding the fuel, excluding the cladding surrounding the plenum volume, were 
to react. 
(4) Coolable geometry 
Calculated changes in core geometry shall be such that the core remains amenable 
to cooling. 
(5) Long-term cooling 
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After any calculated successful initial operation of the Emergence Core Cooling 
System (ECCS), the calculated core temperature shall be maintained at an 
acceptably low value and decay heat shall be removed for the extended period of 
time required by the long-lived radioactivity remaining in the core. 
It should be noted that the acceptance criteria of ECCS performance evaluation 
include PCT, oxidation limit and hydrogen generation. Each criterion needs to be 
justified separately. In this dissertation, we are focusing on risk-informed PCT margin 
characterization to demonstrate the RISMC methodology. The characterization of other 
safety parameter in a risk-informed manner can go through the same process suggested 
in our work. 
2.1.1 Traditional Appendix K methodology 
Historically the initial licensing procedures that governed analysis were 
established in 1974 when the USNRC published rules for LOCA analysis in 10 CFR 
50.46 and Appendix K. Analysis following these rules is known as a (very) conservative 
approach. In the traditional Appendix K methodology, not only all the conservative 
physical models required by the Appendix K of 10 CFR 50 shall be adopted, but also 
the conservative plant parameters need to be applied to define a plant bounding status 
for LBLOCA licensing analysis. According to the Appendix K of 10 CFR 50, there are 
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totally about 30 individual requirements and those conservative requirements can be 
divided into four groups；  
(1) Source of heat during LOCA 
Associated consideration includes (a) initial operating power, (b) power 
distribution, (c) initial stored energy in fuel, (d) fission heat, (e) decay of actinides, 
(f) fission product decay, (g) water metal reaction, (h) reactor internal heat transfer, 
and (i) Pressurized water reactor (PWR) primary-to-secondary heat transfer.   
(2) Swelling and rupture of cladding and fuel rod thermal parameters 
Each evaluation model shall include a provision for predicting cladding swelling 
and rupture from consideration of the axial temperature distribution of the cladding 
and from the difference in pressure between the inside and outside of the cladding, 
both as functions of time. The degree of swelling and rupture shall be taken into 
account in calculations of gap conductance, cladding oxidation and embrittlement, 
and hydrogen generation.  
(3) Blowdown hydraulics and heat transfer 
Associated consideration includes (a) break spectrum analysis, (b) discharge 
model, (c) end of blowdown, (d) nodding near break and the ECCS injection points, 
(e) frictional losses in pipes and other components, (f) conservation of momentum 
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equation, (g) pump model, (h) hot channel cross flow, inlet enthalpy, and core flow 
smoothing, (i) critical heat flux, (j) nucleate boiling heat transfer lockout during 
blowdown, (k) post-CHF heat transfer correlations, and  
(l) transition boiling heat transfer lockout during blowdown. 
(4) Post blowdown hydraulics and heat transfer 
Associated consideration includes (a) single failure criterion, (b) containment back 
pressure, (c) calculation of reflood rate for PWRs, (d) steam interaction with ECC 
water in PWRs, and (e) refill and refold heat transfer for PWRs. 
2.1.2 Best-estimate plus uncertainty quantification methodology (BEPU) 
As stated in the current 10 CFR 50.46, realistic LOCA analysis is accepted. 
However, the uncertainties in the analysis method and input must be identified and 
assessed so that the uncertainty in the calculated results can be estimated. This 
calculational uncertainty must be accounted for, so that, when the calculated cooing 
performance is compared to the acceptance criteria, there is a high level of probability 
that the acceptance criteria would not be exceeded. 
Generally, there three kinds of uncertainty were contributed to the calculational 
uncertainty, namely code uncertainty, plant status uncertainty and representation 
uncertainty. The original sources of code uncertainty generally involve conservation 
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equations, closure and constitutive equations, scaling effects, special process and 
component models and numerical methods. As for origins of the plant status uncertainty, 
operational uncertainty, measurement uncertainty and fabrication uncertainty are 
generally involved. Regarding the representation uncertainty, it is originated from 
different nodding scheme. However, nodding criteria would be fixed when quantifying 
associated model uncertainty by simulation of appropriate separate-effect experiments 
or integral-effect experiments. In traditional Appendix K methodology, above three 
kinds of uncertainties all are conservatively treated by applying conservative Appendix 
K models, bounding state assumptions and nodding sensitivity studies.   
To quantify the calculational uncertainty of a realistic LOCA analysis, a CSAU 
(code, scaling, applicability ad uncertainty) methodology (Boyack et al., 1989) was 
suggested and endorsed by the U.S. NRC. 14 steps defined in the CSAU methodology 
were strictly followed to properly quantify calculational uncertainty, and they are 
shown in Figure 2-1. Fourteen steps are grouped into three elements；  
(I) Element one； requirements and capabilities 
Scenario modeling requirements are identified and compared against code 
capabilities to determine the code’s applicability to the particular scenario and to 
identify potential limitations. The applicability of a code to the analysis of a transient 
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in Nuclear power plant (NPP) is determined by comparison of the scenario and plant-
dictated requirements with the simulation capabilities of the code. This element consists 
of 6 steps. Six steps include (1) specify scenario, (2) select NPP, (3) identify and rank 
phenomena, (4) select frozen code, (5) provide complete code documentation, and (6) 
determine code applicability. 
(II) Element two； assessment and ranging of parameters 
Code capabilities to calculate processes important to the scenario are assessed 
against experimental data and to specify ranges of parameters needed for sensitivity 
studies. The determination of a code’s uncertainty must be based on a sufficient data 
set. Assessment studies are particularly important for the minimum data base will 
necessarily include both separate and integral effects tests. To develop the assessment 
matrix, the Phenomena Identification Ranking Table (PIRT) is reviewed and 
experiments selected that best address the important phenomena and component. This 
element consists of 4 steps. Four steps involve (7) establish assessment matrix, (8) 
define nodalization for NPP calculation, (9) determine code and experiment accuracy, 
and (10) determine effect of scale.  
(III) Element three； sensitivity and uncertainty analysis 
The effect of individual contributors to total uncertainty is obtained and the 
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propagation of uncertainty through the transient is properly determined. The ultimate 
objective of the CSAU process is to provide a simple, singular statement of uncertainty 
with the primary safety criteria used as the basis for determining the acceptability of a 
specific reactor design. This element consists of 4 steps. Four steps involve (11) 
determine effect of reactor input parameters and state, (12) perform NPP sensitivity 
calculations, (13) combine biases and uncertainties, and (14) total uncertainty to 
calculate specific scenario in a specific NPP. 
Typical PCT responses of different trials from LBLOCA BEPU analysis were 
shown in Figure 2-2, and a general process of BEPU analysis can be depicted in Figure 
2-3. 
2.1.3 Deterministic-realistic hybrid methodology (DRHM) 
Considering uncertainties in a best-estimate LOCA analysis, generally there are 
two kinds of uncertainties required to be identified and quantified, namely model 
uncertainties and plant status uncertainties, as depicted in Figure 2-3. Particularly, it 
will take huge effort to systematically quantify individual model uncertainty for a best-
estimate LOCA code, such as RELAP5-3D (Jonson, 1989), TRAC (Liles, 1981), 
CATHARE (Bestion, 1990), et al. As recommended by the U.S. NRC, the CSAU 
methodology was endorsed by USNRC to quantify the calculation uncertainty in the 
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PCT evaluation. As stated in the CSAU methodology, there are three major elements 
involving 14 steps to quantify LBLOCA calculation uncertainty. These three elements 
are (1) requirements and capabilities, (2) assessment and ranging of parameters, and (3) 
sensitivity and uncertainty analysis.  
Instead of applying a full-range The Best-Estimate LOCA (BELOCA) 
methodology to cover both model and plant status uncertainties, a deterministic-
realistic hybrid methodology (DRHM) (Liang, 2011) was developed to support the 
LOCA licensing analysis with RELAP5-3D/K. In the DRHM methodology, Appendix 
K deterministic evaluation models are still adopted to ensure model conservatism, while 
BEPU methodology is applied to quantify the effect of plant status uncertainty on PCT 
calculation.  
In the DRHM methodology, to statistically consider the plant status uncertainties 
six sequential steps are included, which are (1) ranking of plant status parameters, (2) 
ranging of plant status uncertainties, (3) development of a run matrix by random 
sampling, (4) using the conservative E.M. model to perform the LOCA analysis of each 
trial, (5) statistical analysis of the calculated figure of merit (PCTs), and (6) determining 
licensing value of PCT. The DRHM procedure is presented in Figure 2-4. Each step is 
elaborated as follows； 
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(1) Ranking of Plant Status Parameters 
Essential plant parameters should be identified and ranked to limit the scope of 
uncertainty analysis. Three kinds of elements contribute to the uncertainty of a 
particular plant status parameter, namely measurement uncertainty, fabrication 
uncertainty and normal operational range. Typical PWR essential plant status 
parameters are listed in Table 2-2. The RCS flow and containment pressure are 
conservatively set as the thermal design flow and atmospheric pressure respectively. 
Therefore, they are not included in Table 2-2. 
(2) Ranging of Plant Status Uncertainties 
To define the uncertainty of a plant parameter, not only the uncertainty range but 
also the distribution function should be specified. The major plant status parameters 
generally define the system initial conditions, core initial conditions, ECCS initial 
conditions, boundary conditions and system settings. The uncertainty ranges of major 
plant parameters listed in Table 2-2 are directly cited from Westinghouse BELOCA 
analysis for Taiwan’s Maanshan PWR (Taiwan Power Company, 2013). 
(3) Development of a Run Matrix by Random Sampling 
Once the major system parameters have been identified and ranged, random 
sampling of each parameter needs to be performed to generate a run matrix. In each 
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trial, each plant parameter listed in Table 2-2 will be randomly selected within its’ 
uncertainty range. Therefore, the uncertainty of each parameter can be randomly 
combined in each trial. Typical parameter samplings of Tavg, P, FQ and FΔH are 
presented in Figure 2-5. The run matrix should consist of trials of either 59 sets, 93 sets 
or 124 sets according to the order statistic method (David and Nagaraja, 1980). 
(4) Using the Conservative E.M. Model to Perform LOCA Analysis of Each Trial 
The conservative plant E.M. model should be applied to analyze each trial to 
calculate the associated PCT. RELAP5-3D/K, an Appendix K version of the RELAP5-
3D, was adopted to build a plant specific model. 
(5) Statistical Analysis of the Calculated Figure of Merit (PCTs) 
Once the PCT of each trial is calculated, both non-parametric (David, 1980) and 
parametric (Devore, 2004) statistical approaches can be applied to determine the 
statistical upper tolerance limit. The non-parametric approach can conservatively 
estimate of value of PCT95/95, while parametric approach can directly calculate the 
PCT95/95 
(i) Non-parametric approach,  
In this approach, it is not necessary to identify the distribution of PCT outcomes. 
If only one outcome is cited from each trail, the Wilk’s formula (David, 1980) can be 
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applied to calculate the estimator of the 95/95 upper tolerance limit.  
N
  1                                                     (2-1) 
where  is the confidence level,  is the tolerance limit and N is the required number of 
samples. According to the Wilk’s formula, the 95/95 value can be conservatively 
estimated by the greatest PCT value from 59 trials, the 2nd highest PCT value from 93 
trials, or the 3rd highest PCT value from 124 trials. That is； 
)59(
195/95 st
YY 
 or 
)93(
295/95 nd
YY 
  or  
)124(
395/95 rd
YY 
           (2-2) 
If more than one outcome needs to be cited from each trial, Guba’s formula (Guba, 
2003) can be used； 
 𝛃 = ∑
𝐍!
(𝐍−𝐉)!𝐉!
𝛄𝐣(𝟏 − 𝛄)𝐍−𝐣𝐍−𝐏𝐣=𝟎                          (2-3) 
where N is the sample size and P is the number of output variables. If the output variable 
is only one, then the Guba’s formula will be reduced to Wilk’s formula. 
(ii) Parametric approach 
In this approach, the distribution of outcome needs to be identified by using fitting 
test, such as goodness-of-fitting test. If a certain distribution can be identified, such as 
normal distribution or uniform distribution, the population mean (p) and population 
standard deviation (p) can be projected by the sample mean (s) and the sample 
standard deviation (s) under a certain confidence level, such as 95%. If a normal 
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distribution can be assumed by the goodness-of-fitting test, then  
  𝐏 {−𝐭𝛂(𝐧 − 𝟏) ≤ [
(𝛍𝐬 − 𝛍𝐩)
(𝛔𝐬 √𝐧⁄ )
⁄ ]} = 𝟏 − 𝛂                 (2-4) 
and 
  𝐏 {𝛘𝟏−𝛂
𝟐 (𝐧 − 𝟏) ≤ [
𝛔𝐬
𝟐(𝐧 − 𝟏)
𝛔𝐩𝟐
⁄ ]} = 𝟏 − 𝛂                      (2-5) 
are all satisfied as 1- confidence level. Therefore, p and p under the 1- confidence 
level can be expressed as；  
  𝛍𝐩,𝟏−𝛂 ≤ [𝛍𝐬 + 𝐭𝛂(𝐧 − 𝟏) ∗ 𝛔𝐬 √𝐧⁄ ]                          (2-6) 
   𝛔𝐩,𝟏−𝛂
𝟐 ≤
𝛔𝐬
𝟐(𝐧−𝟏)
𝐱𝟏−𝛂
𝟐 (𝐧−𝟏)
                                        (2-7) 
where t(n-1) is the student t variable at the (1-) confidence level under (n-1) degree 
of freedom, and )1(
2
1


n

 is
2
 variable at the (1-) confidence level under (n-1) 
degree of freedom. Once p and p can be projected at the 95% confidence level (p,95% , 
p,95% ), the 95/95 coverage can be directly expressed as； 
%95,%95,95/95
645.1
pp
Y  
                                      (2-8) 
(6) Determining the Licensing Value of PCT 
If both parametric and nonparametric approaches can be applied to calculate the 
95/95 upper tolerance limit, then the maximum value of these two calculations will be 
defined as the licensing value of PCT. That is； 
),max(
95/95sin ordergLicen
PCTPCTPCT 
                            (2-9) 
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where PCT95/95 is the PCT statistical upper bounding value determined by the 
parametric approach, and PCTorder is the PCT statistical upper bounding value estimated 
by the non-parametric order statistic method. 
 
2.2 Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) analysis.  
General speaking, all uncertainties can be categorized into epistemic uncertainty 
and aleatory uncertainty. Epistemic uncertainty results from the “imperfect knowledge” 
regarding values of parameters of the underlying computational model, whereas 
aleatory uncertainty results from the effect of “inherent randomness” or “stochastic 
variability”. Aleatory uncertainty represents the nondeterministic and unpredictable 
random nature of the performance of the system and its components. In the current 
advanced deterministic BEPU licensing safety analysis methodologies (Westinghouse, 
2005) (Martin, R.P., 2005) (Framatome ANP, 2001), only epistemic uncertainty is 
considered which involves both best-estimate mechanistic models and realistic plan 
status parameters. On the contrary to a surrogate sequence generally applied in 
traditional deterministic methodologies, to dealing with the aleatory uncertainty, a 
group of sequences should be identified for a particular initiating event with 
Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) skill (Henley and Kumamoto, 1981) to account 
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systems or components failure by random probability. In a sense, the aleatory 
uncertainty causing system and/or component radon failure is systematically 
considered in PSA event tree and fault tree analysis techniques. 
2.2.1 Risk assessment method  
PSA models developed for nuclear power plants can provide insights into the 
contributors to plant safety and a vehicle for marking future decisions on a variety of 
issues affecting operation and safety. In order to make the PSA to be useful in this way, 
it is essential that the methods used to develop the plant model and obtain the 
quantitative results be clearly understood, reproducible, and adaptable. A summary of 
the methods for the PSA analysis is provided below. 
The traditional PSA model is an attempt to describe in logical way the many events 
that can occur in a nuclear plant following a requirement to shut the reactor down. There 
is therefore the requirement to evaluate how the equipment and operators perform in 
order to prevent core melt over the widest possible range of component failure and 
success. By means of data derived from plant operating experience of nuclear plants, it 
is possible to estimate the frequency with which these events will occur. 
The risk assessment is performed in three stages； 
I. Development of plant system and operations model 
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II. Quantification of core melt sequences 
III. Interpretation of results 
This process is iterated, in whole and in part, to the extent necessary to ensure that 
the final results constitute the most accurate model of the plant and reflect a thorough 
understanding of the most significant aspects of system design and operation. When the 
quantification phase of analysis is complete, it is necessary to identify the highest core 
melt frequency and determine what assumptions have been made during the analysis. 
Most of the methods used in the study are described in detail in the PRA Procedures 
Guide (USNRC, 1983).  
The breakdown of the three phases of the analysis into the various tasks and 
subtasks is shown in figure 2-6. The three tasks in the first phase are definition of the 
initiating event leading to reactor trip；establishment of the success criteria for the 
various system called upon following reactor trip；and delineation of the sequences of 
events that result from the successes of failures of these systems or from failures on the 
part of the operator, and that lead to core melt. The model for the latter task is the event 
tree. Once the various combinations of system failures and successes for a given 
sequence of events are defined, the frequency of each sequence is then determined from 
the data on component failure and other failures modeled. This quantification is 
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performed using the appropriate software (such as WinNURPRA 3.0). Finally, the 
dominant sequences are examined in detail and range of importance, sensitivity, and 
uncertainly analyses are performed in order to identity the important contributor to core 
melt. 
Initiating events are divided into two types："internal," or those cause either by 
the failure of component or by personnel action during testing or maintenance；and 
"external," those arising outside the direct confines of the system and whose occurrence 
not only leads to reactor trip but also affects the performance of mitigating systems. 
The analysis thereof involves constructing the various plant models and performing the 
quantification for the internal events, and then repeating the process for the external 
events. It can be seen from figure 2-6 that substantial supporting analysis is required. 
This is described below.  
 
Success Criteria 
In order to determine the performance required of system or group of systems, it 
is first necessary to define "success." It has been defined as keeping the fuel temperature 
below 1477.6 K and over the long term keeping the containment pressure below its 
evaluated failure pressure. 
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It is convenient to consider requirement for success in term of one or more of the 
following basic functions； 
1. Reactivity control. 
2. Reactor coolant system boundary overpressure control. 
3. Reactor coolant inventory control. 
4. Long-term containment heat removal. 
Each of the system in the plant, both safety and non-safety grade, is assessed for 
its capability to perform one or more of the above functions. Finally, the minimal group 
of systems that can perform the necessary functions to maintain core cooling for each 
group of initiating event can be defined.   
Event Trees 
   The next step is the analysis is to develop the sequences of events that lead to core 
melt following the initiating event. The model used to present this information is the 
event tree shown in figure 2-6. Each tree is developed horizontally by a series of 
heading. The first heading on the left identifies the initiating event and succeeding ones 
the various stages in the accident sequence. The latter include those system responses 
and operator actions specified in the development of the success criteria. There is often 
a branching of the tree at each point in the sequence that is, below each heading. The 
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upper branch signifies an affirmative answer and lower branch a negative answer to 
question implicit in the heading. Thus, for a heading like "Bleed and Feed", the upper 
branch represent the success thereof and the lower branch failure. No branching under 
a heading means that the system or operator response is irrelevant to the core damage 
state. The resulting event tree identifies the various paths to core melt as well as the 
many success paths. 
   Each of the heading in this tree represents one of the key system identified in the 
success criteria, or a combination of two or more systems. Each of these systems 
depends on other systems, hence a failure logical model must be constructed to show 
the combination of failures that can lead to functional failure. This model is known as 
function-level fault tree. Such trees can be quite complicated when all functional 
dependencies, include operator error, are included.   
System Modeling (Fault Tree) 
As insufficient data exist for determining the probability of failure of each system 
directly, it is necessary to model the system in a logical way, breaking it down to 
individual components for which failure data are available or can be estimated. The 
basic model used in this study as in all other PSA is the fault tree.  
The systems for which fault tree models are required are defined in the 
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development of the success criteria and event trees. The list includes the support 
systems such as instrumentation and control, electric power, cooling, and air. For each 
system a tree has been developed to the level of individual component failures, either 
failure to operate failure by being in the wrong position, unavailability due to testing or 
maintenance, or failure on the part of the operator. The interface between a system such 
as high-head safety injection system and the electric power, cooling, and 
instrumentation and combined with that for the front-line system. In the case of 
instrumentation and electric power, the various trains and subsystem have been 
modeled to the level of individual relays, sensors, and breakers to ensure that 
commonalities between systems are now lost.   
Human factors 
System and functional failure may result from the operator’s failure to perform 
certain functions of his performance of the on correct function. Therefore, operator 
actions are included in the event and fault trees for internally and externally initiated 
events. In this analysis, therefore, two types of failure have been clearly identified； 
1. Human error occurring prior to the accident. 
2. Human error of failure to perform a function in response to an accident. 
The first group can be broken down into actions that leave a system in a failed state, 
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such as leaving valves in the wrong position following maintenance, and actions that 
cause a rector to trip. Moreover, the second group can be broken down into three sets 
of actions； failing to take the correct action, taking the incorrect actions by stopping 
an already successful system, or failure to take the appropriate recovery action 
following a system failure.  
 
 
2.2.2 Traditional Large LOCA event (AEC, 1987) 
The PSA LBLOCA sequence analysis is focusing on the quantification of CDF 
contributed by an initiating event of LBLOCA. Therefore, the traditional analysis of 
PSA LBLOCA sequences will include long-term system responses and operator action. 
While as for the PSA LBLOCA analysis for the risk-informed LOCA PCT safety 
margin characterization, only short-term LBLOCA phases (blowdown, refill and 
reflood) will be involved and operator action will not allow. 
The sequence of events following a large break LOCA can be divided into four 
phases； blowdown, refill, reflood, and long-term cooling. Appendix B1 (AEC, 1987) 
illustrates the sequence of events and timing for each of the phases and provides data 
on long-term containment response. After the safety inject signal (less 1 sec), two high-
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head pumps and two Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pumps should automatically start. 
For the success criteria, to prevent damage to the fuel, two accumulators and the at least 
one low-head RHR pump must inject water to reflood the core Reactor Coolant System 
(RCS). The High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) system cannot inject sufficient water 
to reflood the core fast enough and at least one low-head pumps. The steam blowdown 
raises the containment pressure high enough to actuate the containment spray system 
(CSS) (about 20 sec). 
The Refueling-water Storage tank (RWST) decrease rapidly as injection continues 
with full flow from two centrifugal charging pumps (CCPs), two RHR pumps, and two 
containment spray pumps, all of which take suction from the RWST in the injection 
phase. When the RWST low-low level alarm occurs, the operator must change over to 
recirculation. The low-low level signal automatically opens the engineered-safety-
feature recirculation sump to RHR pump suction valves both on train A and train B, 
and the operators are required to close the RWST to the RHR pump and CCP suction 
valves. It is no essential for the operator to close the RWST suction valves immediately, 
as the pressure in the containment and thus at the pump suction is well above 
atmospheric pressure and because of this, water is not being sucked from the RWST. 
The two high-head pumps and the two containment spray pumps keep on drawing water 
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from RWST. As there is no automatic opening of the containment spray sump valves, 
the operator has to manually open these valves and close the RWST spray system 
suction valves before the RWST in empty. According to analysis, the low-low level is 
reach in 24 min, and the time from that level to empty is 14 min. 
A large break in one of the cold legs can have an impact on the ability to cool the 
core in the long term；an extended period of boiling in the core may lead to the 
precipitation of sufficient boron to block flow through the core, thereby producing a 
loss of cooling and, ultimately, core damage. This can occur because most of the flow 
into the cold legs does enter the core but drains through the broken leg. To counteract 
the precipitation of boron, it is necessary to change over to hot-leg recirculation, thereby 
producing reverse flow through the core sometime before 24 hours have passed. The 
exact timing is not critical, and clear instructions concerning the changeover are given 
in the procedures. 
Another impact of the large cold-leg break is a sharp reduction in the direct transfer 
of decay heat to the circulation sump water that bypasses the core. Most of this water 
is released into the containment as stem, thus accelerating the increase in containment 
pressure. 
Although the spry system is not essential for preventing containment overpressure 
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in a large LOCA, its operation is critical to the required initiation of long -term 
containment heat removal is response to a cold-leg break. In the long term, decay heat 
is removed from the containment by means of either RHR heat exchange of fan cooler. 
Both of them rely on cooling by component cooling water (CCW). Failure of the CSS 
reduces the transfer of heat to the sump water and hence the RHR heat exchanger is less 
effective；thus, only the fan cooler is capable or removing heat from the containment. 
According to calculations, the containment pressure reaches 120 psig in 21 hours if 
neither the CSS nor the fan cooler is actuated. Assuming the CSS actuates and runs, 
containment pressure does not reach 120 psig until about 28 hours into the event. 
Containment spray system performance is a very important consideration in the 
development of source terms. 
Figure 2-7 shows the event tree for a large LOCA. Note that the reactor protection 
system (RPS) is not required for successful mitigation, as the rapid depressurization 
and steam voiding render the reactor subcritical. The success criteria for each of the 
functions are summarized below. 
 
Heading I：Injection of two effective accumulators 
The accumulators are designed to injection when RCS pressure drops to 600 psig. 
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For a double-ended-rupture LOCA, this occurs about 11 sec after the break and 
accumulators empty about 45 sec. For a large LOCA, two effective accumulators are 
required to inject. Injection flow into the ruptured loop is not considered to be effective. 
Although failure of accumulator injection may not lead to core meltdown if low-head 
pump injections, it dose cause some fuel damage and thus is considered a core melt 
sequence in LBLOCA. The success criterion is as follows： 
     Two of two effective accumulators inject into the undamaged loops. 
 
Heading J：Low-head safety injection  
For successful injection, one of two RHR pumps must inject water with in 1 min. 
In the standby mode, the pumps are aligned to take suction from the RWST. No credit 
is taken for manual initiation of the pumps because of the short time available for such 
action. Since RWST above the low-low level, in the event of the largest break and full 
injection flow, the low-low level alarm occurs after approximately 24 min. However, 
in the case of the minimal injection flow (with one RHR pump and no containment 
spray pumps), it occurs at 110 min. Thus, the time used for determining the pump-
running failure probability is based on the latter running time.  
 The success criterion is as follows： 
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One of two RHR pumps automatically starts and injects water into one 
unruptured leg of the RCS for 2 hours. 
 
Heading H：Low-head safety recirculation 
When the RWST low-low level alarm setpoint is reached, the RHR sump suction 
valves automatically open. As the containment pressure is much higher than that of the 
RWST (i.e., atmospheric pressure) the sump water is circulated through the RCS. The 
high-head pumps and containment spray pumps continue to take suction from RWST. 
At the low-low level alarm setpoint, 14300 gal remain in the RWST and, therefore, to 
avoid failure of the high-head pumps and possible ingress of air into the recirculation 
system when the containment pressure drops to around atmospheric pressure, the 
operator is required to isolate the RHR and containment spray pump suctions from the 
RWST before it is empty. The timing for this action is 14 min. However, since 
containment pressure is higher than atmospheric pressure for a very long time, isolation 
of the RWST from RHR is not required for successful low-head safety recirculation.  
The success criterion for low-head safety recirculation is as follows： 
One train of RHR sump suction valves automatically open on an RWST low-low 
level signal. One RHR pump operates for 24 hours in the low-head recirculation 
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mode, taking suction from the containment sump and discharging to one 
unruptured cold leg of the RCS. 
 
Heading F：Containment spray system recirculation 
The CSS is not required to operate to prevent core melt. It is included in the event 
tree, however, because in the event of a large cold-leg break it significantly affects to 
the timing of cations prior to containment failure. After such a break, the decay heat is 
essentially transferred directly to the containment and not both the sump water and the 
containment, for the reasons cited earlier. If the containment spray is available, then the 
containment atmosphere and sump water remain in equilibrium and the pressure rise is 
more gradual, allowing a much longer time in witch to initiate long-term heat removal. 
More important, following successful containment spray recirculation, either the RHR 
heat exchanger or fan coolers can remove heat from the containment； with the CSS 
inoperative, the fan coolers are the only effective heat removal system. The success 
criterion for containment spray is as follow： 
The operator performs changeover to recirculation in 14 min after the RWST 
reaches the low-low level. One containment spray train operates in the 
recirculation mode for 24 hours, taking suction from the containment sump and 
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discharging through one header. 
 
Heading G：Long-term containment heat removal 
Containment heat removal can be accomplished by either of two system： the 
RHR system or the containment fan coolers. In each case one train or unit is adequate 
to prevent containment overpressure. The two sequences in the event tree following 
successful changeover to low-head safety recirculation (LHSR) are success and failure 
of containment spray. For the latter case, the RHR heat exchanger is considered to be 
ineffective. If both the fan coolers and the CSS fail to operate, changeover to hot-leg 
recirculation earlier (less than 20 hours into the event) can prevent early containment 
failure, and decay heat can be removed by the RHR heat exchanger. As these sequence 
do not make a significant contribution to the overall core melt frequency, this level of 
detail has not been modeled. The success criteria for this function are as follow： 
 
For successful containment spray operation： 
One train of the RHR heat exchanger system or one unit of the containment fan 
coolers is initiated within 28 hours following the successful establishment of 
recirculation. 
36 
 
 
 
For unsuccessful containment spray operation： 
One unit of the containment fan coolers is initiated within 21 hours and operates 
for 24 hours. 
Heading HH：Low-head hot-leg recirculation 
To avoid channel blockage due to boron precipitation, the operator is required to 
transfer from cold-leg recirculation to hot-leg recirculation within 24 hours into the 
event. Failure of the changeover results in core damage, bit core meltdown is unlikely. 
In the fault tree for this top event, only the operator actions and the performance of the 
associated valves are modeled. Failure of the RHR pump to run for 24 hours is 
considered in the modeling of low-head (cold-leg) recirculation, hence not in this 
function. The succeed criterion for changeover to hot-leg recirculation is as follow： 
The operator performs the necessary to change over to hot-leg recirculation before 
core channel blockage occurs. According to the procedure, he takes this action 
approximately 24 hours into the event. 
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Figure 2-1. 14 Steps of CSAU Methodology (Boyack et al., 1989) 
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Figure 2-2. PCTs of Different Trials from Westinghouse BEPU LBLOCA Analysis 
(Westinghouse, 2005) 
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Figure 2-3. General Process for BEPU Analysis 
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Figure 2-4. Procedures of DRHM 
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Figure 2-5. Typical Parameter Samplings 
 
 
Figure 2-6. Analysis flow for determining core melt frequency (AEC, 1987) 
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Figure 2-7. Event tree for a large LOCA (AEC, 1987) 
43 
 
 
 
Table 2-1 Historical Prospective of LBLOCA Regulation 
Years Events 
Prior to 1966 LBLOCA not considered for ECCS design 
1966 - 1969 Atomic energy Commission concerned about LBLOCA, 
and accumulators added to plant design.  
1971 Interim acceptance criteria, LBLOCA become design basis 
accident. 
1974 Final acceptance criteria, 10 CFR 50.46 and Appendix K 
requirements defines evaluation model of 1974. 
1988 10 CFR 50.46 revised to allow best-estimate calculations. 
1996 First best estimate LBLOCA evaluation model approved for 
Westinghouse (CSAU) 
2003 Best estimate LBLOCA evaluation model approved for 
AREVA (order statistics) 
2003 Revised best estimate LBLOCA evaluation model approved 
for Westinghouse (order statistics) 
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Table 2-2. Uncertainties of the Major Plant Parameters of Typical PWRs 
Parameter Distribution Min Max 
Core thermal power Uniform 101.38% 102%* 
Initial average fluid 
temperature (Tavg),K 
Uniform 579.71 584.15* 
Pressurizer pressure 
(PRCS), kpa 
Uniform 15168.47 15857.94* 
Accumulator liquid 
volume (VACC), m3 
Uniform 27.89* 28.74 
Accumulator pressure 
(PACC), kpa 
Uniform 4357.49* 4688.44 
Accumulator temperature 
(TACC), K 
Uniform 310.93 338.71* 
Safety injection 
temperature (TSI),  
Uniform 282.59 322.04* 
Peak heat flux hot channel 
factor (FQ) 
Uniform (2.137±0.137) 
& normal (σ=2.6%) 
2.000-4σ 
2.274+4σ 
(2.42*) 
Peak hot rod enthalpy rise 
hot channel factor (F△H) 
Normal (mean=1.65, 
σ=2.43%) 
Mean-4σ 
Mean+4σ 
(1.72*)  
Off-site power Random  Loop* Non-loop 
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Chapter 3. Fundamentals of RISMC Methodology 
A traditional deterministic safety analysis methodology is generally applied to 
analyze DBA based on a surrogate or licensing sequence, without considering how low 
this sequence occurrence probability is. Although the occurrence probability of such 
licensing sequence generally is lower, it does satisfy all required conservative 
assumptions for DBA licensing analysis, such as single-failure criteria, loss of off-site 
power, et al. In traditional licensing safety analysis, other than the chosen surrogate 
sequence, calculation uncertainty also needs to be considered, which involves both 
model uncertainty and plant status uncertainty. By proper consideration of these two 
uncertainties (IAEA, 2008), calculation uncertainty can be well quantified. In general, 
these two types of uncertainties can be categorized as epistemic uncertainty. 
Traditionally, only conservative Appendix K methodology is allowed to perform 
LBLOCA licensing analysis. Whereas, in the revised 10 CFR 50.46 (USNRC, 1988), 
best estimate plus uncertainty (BEPU) has been allowed and regulatory guide 1.157 
(USNRC, 1989) clearly states how to quantify associated calculation uncertainty. 
Although BEPU methodology (Boyack, et al., 1989) is legally allowed to replace 
conservative Appendix K methodology (USNRC, 1974), it is still a revised 
deterministic methodology based on a predetermined licensing sequence.  
In general, all uncertainties can be categorized into epistemic uncertainty and 
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aleatory uncertainty. Epistemic uncertainty results from the “imperfect knowledge” 
regarding values of parameters of the underlying computational model, whereas 
aleatory uncertainty results from the effect of “inherent randomness” or “stochastic 
variability”. Aleatory uncertainty represents the nondeterministic and unpredictable 
random nature of the performance of the system and its components. In the current 
advanced BEPU licensing safety analysis methodologies (Westinghouse, 2005) (Martin, 
R.P., 2005) (Framatome ANP, 2001), only epistemic uncertainty is considered which 
involves both best-estimate mechanistic models and realistic plan status parameters. On 
the contrary to a surrogate sequence generally applied in traditional deterministic 
methodologies, to dealing with the aleatory uncertainty, a group of sequences should 
be identified for a particular initiating event with Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) 
skill (Henley and Kumamoto, 1981) to account systems or components failure by 
random probability. In a sense, the aleatory uncertainty causing system and/or 
component radon failure is systematically considered in PSA event tree and fault tree 
analysis techniques. 
As stated in the to-be-issued 10 CFR 50.46a, any applicant, permit holder, or 
licensee or other entity who wishes to make changes enabled by this new rule 
considering the LBLOCA as a beyond DBA accident, to the facility, facility design, or 
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procedures or to the technical specifications shall perform a risk-informed evaluation. 
According to the 10 CFR 50.46a, the risk-informed assessment process must include 
methods for evaluating compliance with the risk criteria, defense-in-depth criteria, 
safety margin criteria, and performance measurement criteria. As required, when 
evaluating the risk-informed safety margin, uncertainties considered should include 
phenomenology, modeling, plant construction, plant operation, etc. (USNRC, 2010c). 
The risk-informed safety margin therefore refers to a view of margin based on a broader 
perspective compared to the safety margin determined by traditional deterministic 
LOCA methodologies. Therefore, according to the proposed 10 CFR 50.46a, statements 
about margin now need to have meaning not only with respect to a design-basis event 
sequence, but more generally with reference to a non design-basis sequence, or even 
group of sequences； a success path or a family of success paths. The newly developed 
risk-informed safety margin characteristic (RISMC) methodology (Hess, 2009) (Smith, 
et al., 2012) (Kang, et al., 2013) (Sherry, et al., 2013) can be applied to calculate the 
risk-informed safety margin for LBLOCA to satisfy the to-be-issued 10 CFR 50.46a.  
The RISMC methodology is a systematic approach to consider both aleatory and 
epistemic uncertainties. To replace the surrogate-based decision making, the main 
scope of the RISMC methodology is to generate a probabilistic load spectrum as shown 
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in Figure 1-2, and quantify the safety margin in a proper risk-informed manner. To 
construct a risk-spaced load spectrum, a set of probabilistically significant scenarios 
(PSS) generated by PSA event tree analysis will be identified and the associated 
consequence will be analyzed with BEPU techniques. 
The risk-informed safety margin characterization (RISMC) pathway provides a 
view of safety margin based on probabilistically significant sequences, which is no 
longer just based on one surrogate or licensing sequence. RISMC claims to reflect both 
stochastic uncertainty and epistemic uncertainty on all probabilistically significant 
sequences. It also suggests that next generation analysis capability should identify two 
distinct activities； one includes the generation, characterization, and quantification of 
scenarios ；  The other is the analysis of a phenomenology of probabilistically-
significant event (R.W. Youngblood, 2010). Therefore, the associated methodology 
should have the capability to complete the integrative analysis of both probabilistically 
significant scenarios (PSSs) and phenomenology. The concept of RISMC methodology 
can be depicted in Figure 3-1. The RISMC methodology intends to combine both PSA 
(Kumamoto and Henley, 1996) and BEPU (Boyack et al., 1989) analysis to consider 
both the aleatory and epistemic uncertainties and to help create more optimized basis 
for decision makings in nuclear power plants (NNPs). 
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  The RISMC methodology systematically combines both probabilistic and 
mechanistic approaches to estimate the safety margin. The probability analysis is 
represented by the stochastic risk analysis with PSA techniques involving both event 
tree and fault tree analysis, whereas mechanistic analysis is represented by the physical 
calculation with evaluation models satisfying requirements set forth in the to-be-issued 
10 CFR 50.46a. Evaluation models can be either conservative Appendix K model or 
realistic models with uncertainty quantification. With the combination of both 
probabilistic and mechanistic analyses, both aleatory uncertainty and epistemic 
uncertainty can be well quantitatively addressed, and a risk-informed peak cladding 
temperature (PCT) margin of LBLOCA can be evaluated. 
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Figure 3-1. Pathway of RISMC Methodology (R.W. Youngblood, 2010) 
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Chapter 4. Analysis of a Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident and 
PCT Margin Evaluation with the RISMC Methodology 
To perform risk-informed LBLOCA analysis with the RISMC methodology, a 
load spectrum of LBLOCA will be generated and both aleatory and epistemic 
uncertainties will be quantified. In the risk-spaced load spectrum, the sequence 
occurrence probability (SOP) of each probabilistically significant sequence will be 
quantified and associated conditional PCT will be evaluated. The following process 
was recommended to calculate the licensing PCT of a LBLOCA to satisfy the risk-
informed safety margin evaluation requirement stated in the to-be-issued 10 CFR 
50.46a. 
(1) Identification of the LBLOCA Sequences 
With the probabilistic safety assessment techniques (Kumamoto & Henley, 1996), 
possible scenarios or sequences of LBLOCA will be identified.  
(2) Quantification of LBLOCA sequence occurrence probabilities 
To address the aleatory uncertainty, the occurrence probability of each sequence 
(sequence occurrence probability, SOP) will be quantified by both event tree and 
fault tree analysis. As a result, those probabilistically significant sequences can be 
identified. 
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(3) Calculation of the nominal PCT for LBLOCA sequences 
As required by the to-be-issued 10 CFR 50.46a, a proper evaluation model which 
meets the requirement of traditional LBLOCA licensing calculation shall be 
applied to perform LBLOCA analysis with nominal settings of both models and 
plant parameters to calculate the nominal conditional peak cladding temperature 
(CPCT) for each probabilistically significant LBLOCA sequence. 
(4) Conducting a preliminary load spectrum of LBLOCA  
By having the CPCT of each probabilistically significant scenario or sequence 
and associated sequence probability, a preliminary load spectrum of LBLOCA can 
be conducted； 
(5) Quantification of calculation uncertainty of the preliminary load spectrum  
In principle, the CPCT95/95 of each probabilistically significant sequence needs to 
be calculated to quantify the PCT calculation uncertainty of each sequence. 
However, there might be too many cases to be calculated. To reduce the load of 
calculation, a practical assumption can be made. That is the calculational 
uncertainty evaluated base on the traditional licensing sequence can be applied to 
other probabilistically significant sequences. Therefore, to account for the 
epistemic or calculation uncertainty of CPCT resulting from physical models and 
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plant status for the preliminary load spectrum, the CPCT95/95 will be calculated 
with proper methodologies (Westinghouse, 2005) (Liang, et al., 2011) (Ludmann, 
M., 1999) based upon the traditional surrogate or licensing sequence, and then 
quantify the difference between the CPCT95/95 and the nominal CPCT calculated 
in step (3) on this surrogate sequence； 
ssssssun
CPCTCPCTPCT
,,95/95, 
                                 (4-1) 
It should be noted that the assumption of using the calculation uncertainty 
evaluated on the traditional licensing sequence to represent the general calculation 
uncertainty needs to be further verified. A reasonable conservatism of the 
surrogate calculation uncertainty needs be demonstrated. Otherwise, CPCT95/95 of 
each probabilistically significant sequence needs to be quantified individually. 
(6) Conducting the final load spectrum for LBLOCA 
With the calculation uncertainty evaluated on the surrogate sequence (PCTun,ss), 
the preliminary load spectrum of LBLOCA will be shifted, as shown in Figure  
4-1, to reflect the calculation uncertainty, instead of calculating the CPCT95/95 for 
each sequence. Therefore, the final CPCT for sequence “i” will be； 
ssunii
PCTCPCTCPCT
,,,

                                    (4-2) 
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and the PCT margin of sequence “i” can then be calculated as； 
iSLiSM
CPCTPCTPCT
,, 


                                   (4-3) 
Where PCTSL is the safety limit required by the regulation and generally is 
1477.5K (2200.0oF).   
(7) The Risk-informed PCT Safety Margin Characterization  
The risk-informed PCT safety margin (PCTRI) can be calculated by two different 
methods； the first one is the expecting value estimation method and the second 
one is the sequence probability coverage method. In the first method, the risk-
informed safety margin can be mathematically defined as (Gavrilas, M., et al., 
2007)； 

 

i
i
i
iiSM
RI
SP
SPPCT
PCT
*
,
                                 (4-4)  
Note that when PCTSM,i of any sequence “i” is less than 0.0, it will be set as 0.0 
to reflect the fact that the risk-informed safety margin of PCT can only be 
contributed by those sequence with positive PCTSM,i. Moreover, note that the 
summation of total sequence probability is equal to unity.  
Alternatively, in the second sequence probability coverage method, the risk-
informed peak cladding temperature (PCTRI
99%) will be defined by a particular 
55 
 
 
 
sequence with a cumulated occurrence probability greater than 99%. Therefore, 
the PCTRI
99% of the second method can be defined by the final CPCT of 
sequence K；  
k
CPCTPCT
,
99%
RI 


                                        (4-5) 
where the sequence “K” is determined by the summation of all the sequence 
probabilities (SP1-k) from the sequence with the lowest CPCT, i by ascending 
order until the SP1-k is greater than 99%.  
%99
1
1
 


k
i
ik
SPSP , with ki CPCTCPCT ,,                   (4-6) 
Therefore, by the second sequence probability coverage method, the risk-informed 
safety PCT margin will be； 
%99
RISLRI
PCTPCTPCT                                       (4-7) 
The above seven major steps were summarized in Figure 4-2 for illustration. In 
the following chapter, the Taiwan’s Maanshan PWR plant (Westinghouse, 1987) 
was referred to demonstrate how to evaluate the risk-informed PCT safety margin 
for LBLOCAs.  
  
56 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-1. Shifted Load Spectrum to Reflect Calculation Uncertainty  
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Figure 4-2. Process for Risk-informed PCT Safety Margin Evaluation  
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Chapter 5. Application of the RISMC Methodology to Evaluate the 
Risk-informed PCT Margin of Taiwan’s Maanshan PWR 
Plant 
5.1 LBLOCA sequence identification and occurrence probability quantification 
According to the to-be-issued 10 CFR 50.46a, LBLOCA will be considered as 
beyond design basis accidents and traditional deterministic licensing sequence can be 
relaxed. Therefore, to address the effect of system and component random failure 
caused by aleatory uncertainty, with probability and risk assessment techniques all 
possible LBLOCA sequences will be identified and the occurrence probability of each 
sequence (sequence probability, SP) can be quantified. In the short term LBLOCA PCT 
analysis, possible sequences were configured by the random combination of the 
individual safety injection system available.  
Considering Taiwan’s Maanshan nuclear plant, a traditional 3-loop Westinghouse 
PWR, Emergence Core Cooling System (ECCS) includes high head injection system, 
low head injection system and accumulators for medium head injection. All above 
safety systems satisfy the single failure criteria and redundancy criteria. To address the 
aleatory uncertainty, the occurrence probability of each sequence (sequence probability, 
SP) will be quantified by both event tree and fault tree analysis and consequently, 
probabilistic significant sequences can be identified. 
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In this thesis, the modified PSA model is mainly divided into two parts； 
I. Identify heading of Events 
II. Modify fault tree models        
   The traditional analysis of PSA LBLOCA sequences will include long-term system 
responses and operator action. While as for the PSA LBLOCA analysis for the risk-
informed LOCA PCT safety margin characterization, only short-term LBLOCA phases 
(blowdown, refill and reflood) will be involved and operator action will not allow. In 
traditional PSA model, the event tree is not a time-dependent model and each top 
heading (function) is not necessarily in temporal sequence in the event analysis. 
Therefore, in order to address the effect of system and component random failure 
caused by aleatory uncertainty with PSA analysis, we should consider the timing of 
thermal hydraulic calculation in LBLOCA and then identify heading of event tree. And 
also consider the impact for fault model, filtering the factors are caused by the long-
term effect in LBLOCA, like Human factor, etc. , and then modify fault tree model. 
I. Identify heading of Events  
In section 2.2.2, the procedure of traditional probabilistic safety assessment for 
LBLOCA analysis was stated. In order to combine with RISMC methodology, there 
are two main subjects need to be revised. Frist of all, according the traditional PSA 
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definition, the success criteria of PSA model is based on calculating the dominant core 
melt sequences in LBLOCA event and the total Core Melt Frequency (CDF). Compare 
with the purpose of RISMC methodology, to quantify all kind system failure 
combination sequences should be the first priority in LBLOCA analysis. Thus, the 
interaction of ECC system and the definition of the event tree will no longer be 
dominated by the core melt sequence. Secondly, considering the results and simulation 
timing of thermal hydraulic calculation in LBLOCA, the peak cladding temperature 
(highest temperature in case) appears within 10 minutes.  
Therefore, we need to modify the traditional PSA model based on above subjects 
in RISMC methodology with focus on the short term PCT evaluation. In traditional 
LBLOCA event tree (Figure 2-7), heading H, heading F, heading G, and heading HH 
will be removed. And then new headings will be added to consider the interaction of 
ECCS in LBLOCA. 
Figure 5-1 shows the new event tree for a large LOCA PSA analysis, and each of the 
heading (functions) definition is summarized as following： 
Heading LOCA：Initiating event for LBLOCA 
Heading LOP：Loss of offsite power 
Heading H0-：Two of centrifugal charging pumps can start and inject coolant to RCS 
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Heading H1-：One of centrifugal charging pumps can start and inject coolant to RCS 
Heading AC0-：All of accumulators inject into loops 
Heading AC1-：Two of accumulators inject into loops 
Heading AC2-：One of accumulators inject into loops 
Heading AC3-：One of accumulators inject into the undamaged loops 
Heading L0-：All of RHR pumps automatically start and inject water into RCS. 
Heading L1-：One of RHR pumps automatically starts and injects water into RCS. 
II. Modify fault tree model  
    The required system fault tree models are defined in the development of new event 
tree. Following the above suggestions for modification of PSA model, each system fault 
(function level) tree will be modified to filter the factors related to the long-term effect 
and interaction of each system in LBLOCA, like Human factor, success criteria of 
switching pump and long-term containment heat removal, etc.   
The calculation of the fault tree model will perform the most dominant factors in 
the result. The final result also can be selected to represent the combination of the most 
dominant factors. In this study, we choose to present 15 important factor combinations 
cut sets to check the correctness of the fault tree model. Each result of system fault tree 
model is shown in Figure 5-2, Figure 5-3, and Figure 5-4. 
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Finally, after modifying the traditional PSA model, in the new headings of the 
event tree analysis, all possible system random failure combinations are considered and 
consequently 108 different event sequences are degenerated. With appropriate fault tree 
analysis, the occurrence probability of each sequence can be well quantified. The 
possible system combination of each sequence is shown in the LBLOCA event tree plot 
(Figure 5-5) and occurrence probabilities of the top fourteen probabilistic significant 
LBLOCA sequences are summarized in Table 5-1. 
 
5.2 Preliminary load spectrum of LBLOCA 
As indicated in section 5.1, fourteen probabilistic significant sequences of 
LBLOCA of Taiwan’s Maanshan nuclear power plant have been identified, as listed in 
Table 5-1. The total occurrence probability of those fourteen probabilistic significant 
sequences is more than 99.99% coverage. To generate a load spectrum for the LBLOCA 
while considering both aleatory and epistemic uncertainties, a two-step approach was 
adopted as elaborated in Chapter 4. The first step is to generate a preliminary load 
spectrum by using RELAP5-3D/K (Liang, K.S., et al., 2002a) (Liang, K.S., et al., 2002b) 
to calculate the nominal conditional PCT (CPCT) for each sequence, and the second 
step is to account for the epistemic or calculation uncertainty of the preliminary load 
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spectrum by using the deterministic-realistic hybrid methodology (DRHM) (Liang, 
K.S., 2011). In the DRHM methodology, conservative Appendix K models were 
adopted to cover model uncertainty, whereas realistic plant status parameters were used 
with statistical uncertainty analysis.  
To calculate the CPCT of those probabilistic significant sequences in the first step, 
all the plant status parameters are set as their nominal values, and a conservative plant 
model for Maanshan LBLOCA analysis (Taiwan Power Company, 2013) is applied, as 
shown in Figure 5-6. The CPCT of the top fourteen probabilistic significant LBLOCA 
sequences were calculated and the associated responses are shown in Figure 5-7. 
Moreover, the resulted CPCT of each probabilistic significant sequence are also 
summarized in Table 5-1 and a plot of CPCT versus associated sequence probability 
is shown in Figure 5-8 to represent the preliminary LBLOCA load spectrum of the 
Maanshan nuclear power plant. It can be observed from the preliminary load spectrum 
that the CPCTgenerally ascends with the descending sequence occurrence probability. 
 
5.3 Final load spectrum with calculational uncertainty quantification 
As stated in section 5-2, a preliminary load spectrum was generated by the 
quantification of each sequence occurrence probability and associated conditional 
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nominal PCT (CPCT). Regarding the feature of the preliminary load spectrum, only 
the aleatory uncertainty was considered, which dictates the configuration of system 
and/or component random failure and associated sequence occurrence probability. In 
this section, the epistemic or calculational uncertainty will be evaluated to modify the 
preliminary load spectrum. 
 
5.3.1 Calculational uncertainty evaluation base on the deterministic licensing 
sequence  
To account for the calculation uncertainty in the second step with DRHM 
methodology, since conservative Appendix evaluation model (RELAP5-3D/K) is 
applied, the remaining calculation uncertainty will be the plant status uncertainties. The 
effect of the plant status uncertainty on PCT calculation was evaluated on the basis of 
the traditional licensing sequence (sequence LOCAS74 in Table 5-1). 
 Referring to a typical PWR best estimate LBLOCA licensing analysis 
(Framatome ANP, 2001), important plant parameters were identified and summarized 
in Table 5-2 with uncertainty ranges. According to the DRHM methodology, at least 
59 trials were required to be randomly generated to quantify the effect of plant status 
uncertainty. It should be noted that break size is not assigned as an uncertainty 
contributor in Table 5-2. In BEPU LOCA methodology, whether the break size is 
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assigned as an uncertainty contributor, depends on the methodology itself. In this 
research, since our focus is the study and application of risk-informed safety margin 
characterization (RISMC) methodology, we simply exclude the break size as a major 
uncertainty contributor by assuming bounding 200% break size. Typical parameter 
samplings are shown in Figure 2-5 for illustration and the detailed 59 trials are listed in 
Table 5-3. The PCT responses of 59 trials are also shown in Figure 5-9 and the PCT of 
each trial are summarized in Table 5-4. Besides, the scattering plot of PCT of each trial 
is also shown in Figure 5-10. By the Wilk’s formula (David and Nagaraja, 1980), the 
PCT of 95% percentile and 95% confidence level can be estimated by the highest PCT 
amount those 59 trials, which is 1367.5 K. With the nominal PCT value of 1289.46 K 
(CPCT,ss) and PCT95/95 value of 1367.5 K(CPCT95/95,ss) evaluated on the licensing 
sequence, the calculation uncertainty according to Equation (4-1) caused by plant status 
uncertainty can be quantified as； 
𝛥𝑃𝐶𝑇𝑢𝑛,𝑠𝑠 = 𝐶𝑃𝐶𝑇95/95,𝑠𝑠 − 𝐶𝑃𝐶𝑇𝜇,𝑠𝑠                              (5-1) 
        =78.0 K 
Accordingly, the preliminary load spectrum can be shifted by 78.0 K to reflect the 
calculation uncertainty 
KCPCTCPCT
ii
0.78
,,

                                      (5-2) 
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The final CPCT of those fourteen probabilistic significant sequences with 
calculation uncertainty evaluated solely based on the licensing sequence are listed in 
the 4th column in Table 5-1. 
5.3.2 Evaluation of the surrogate based calculational uncertainty  
As stated in section 5.3.1, the calculational uncertainty of the LBLOCA load 
spectrum is evaluated base on the sequence 74 named as the surrogate or licensing 
sequence. In this section to evaluate surrogate based assumption, the calculational 
uncertainties of probabilistically significant sequences of top three will also evaluated, 
which involve sequence 1, sequence 55 and sequence 56. The major differences of those 
4 sequences were summarized in Table 5-5. It should be noted that the accumulated 
sequence occurrence probability of the top 3 sequences is more than 99.3%. 
To evaluate the calculation al uncertainty of each dominant sequence, 59 trials 
generated by random sampling for sequence 74 still can be applied on those major plant 
status parameters listed in Table 5-2. Those plant parameters determined by random 
sampling were summarized in Tables 5-3. It should be noted that since the differences 
between sequences are purely availability of systems, therefore the associated 
sequences 1, 55, 56 and 74 can share the common 59 trials of plant status parameters. 
That is, when analyzing any particular trial for each sequence, the associated system 
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availability will be different according to the target sequence to be analyzed. The 
resultant 59 PCTs of sequences 1, 55 and 56 are listed in Table 5-6, 5-7 and 5-8, 
respectively, and the associated data scattering of 59 PCTs of each sequence are plotted 
in Figures 5-11, 5-12 and 5-13. Moreover, the 59 PCT plots for each sequence are also 
shown in Figures 5-14, 5-15 and 5-16, respectively. 
According to the Wilk’s formula (David and Nagaraja, 1980), the PCT of 95% 
percentile and 95% confidence level can be estimated by the highest PCT amount those 
59 trials. Therefore, the PCT95/95 of sequences 1, 55 and 56 can be estimated as 1322.22 
K, 1328.14 and 1329.22 K, respectively. Along with the nominal PCT of each sequence 
listed Table 5-1, the calculation uncertainty of sequences 1, 55 and 56 can be defined 
as； 
∆𝑷𝑪𝑻𝒖𝒏,𝒔𝟏 = 𝑪𝑷𝑪𝑻𝟗𝟓/𝟗𝟓,𝒔𝟏 − 𝑪𝑷𝑪𝑻𝝁,𝒔𝟏  
= 𝟏𝟑𝟐𝟐. 𝟐𝟐𝑲 − 𝟏𝟐𝟐𝟒. 𝟑𝟔𝑲 = 𝟗𝟕. 𝟖𝟗𝑲           (5-3) 
∆𝑷𝑪𝑻𝒖𝒏,𝒔𝟓𝟓 = 𝑪𝑷𝑪𝑻𝟗𝟓/𝟗𝟓,𝒔𝟓𝟓 − 𝑪𝑷𝑪𝑻𝝁,𝒔𝟓𝟓   
 = 𝟏𝟑𝟐𝟖. 𝟏𝟒𝑲 − 𝟏𝟐𝟐𝟗. 𝟓𝟐𝑲 = 𝟗𝟖. 𝟔𝟐𝑲          (5-4) 
∆𝑷𝑪𝑻𝒖𝒏,𝒔𝟓𝟔 = 𝑪𝑷𝑪𝑻𝟗𝟓/𝟗𝟓,𝒔𝟓𝟔 − 𝑪𝑷𝑪𝑻𝝁,𝒔𝟓𝟔 
= 𝟏𝟑𝟐𝟗. 𝟐𝟐𝑲 − 𝟏𝟐𝟒𝟓. 𝟏𝟐𝑲 = 𝟖𝟒. 𝟏𝑲              (5-5) 
As compared with the calculational uncertainty (78.0 K, equation 5-1) evaluated 
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on the licensing sequence, sequence 74, it can be observed that evaluation of the 
calculational uncertainty of the load spectrum solely based on the licensing sequence is 
not a conservation assumption. The calculational uncertainties of sequences 1, 55, 56 
and 74 are summarized in Table 5-9 for comparison. 
 
5.4 Risk-informed PCT margin evaluation 
Since the calculational uncertainty evaluated on the licensing sequence is not 
conservation enough, the associated calculation uncertainties of probabilistically 
significant sequences of top three, namely sequences 1, 55 and 56, will be revised, and 
the final load spectrum for LBLOCA is indicated in the last column of Table 5-1. It is 
worth to note that the accumulated sequence occurrence probability of the top 3 
sequences is more than 99.3%. The risk-informed PCT safety margin (PCTRI) can be 
calculated by two different methods； the first one is the expecting value estimation 
method (equation 4-4) and the second one is the sequence probability coverage method 
(equation 4-5). By using the first expecting value estimation method and data listed in 
Table 5-1, the risk-informed safety margin can be mathematically calculated according 
to Equation (4-4) as follows； 
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iMRRI
SPPCTPCT   *,                                  (5-6) 
        = 152.72 K 
As for the second sequence probability coverage method, it was found that the 
summation of the first 3 sequence (LOCAS01, LOCAS55 and LOCAS56) probabilities 
is 99.3%. Therefore, the third sequence with a value of 1329.22 K will be applied to 
define the risk-informed PCTRI
99%, and the risk-informed safety margin will be as 
follows 
%99
RI
PCTPCTPCT
SLRI

                                     (5-7) 
         = 148.38 K 
Comparing the risk-informed safety margins evaluated by above two methods, it 
can be found that the PCTRI calculated by the sequence probability coverage method 
is reasonably conservative by 4.34 K. Because the occurrence probability was 
dominated by the first three sequences, it was expected that the risk-informed PCT 
safety margin evaluated by either the expecting value estimation method or the 
sequence probability coverage method should not have a significant difference.  
It was observed in the Table 5-1 that in the second sequence probability coverage 
method, the third sequence (LOCAS56) was applied to define the risk-informed safety 
margin (PCTRI99%) and its’ associated occurrence probability is 5.07*10-3, while the 
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occurrence probability of the traditional licensing sequence (LOCAS74) applied in the 
classical deterministic methodology is only 5.46*10-5. In the traditional licensing 
sequence (LOCAS74) only one train of high head and low head injection are available 
respectively to satisfy single failure criteria. While in sequence referred in the 
evaluation of risk-informed PCT safety margin (LOCAS56) to cover 99% cumulated 
occurrence probability, there are two trains of low head injection and one train of high 
head injection available instead. The detailed differences of the first three sequences 
and the traditional surrogate sequence are summarized in Table 5-5. 
 It was also noted that according to the deterministic methodology, the licensing 
PCT can only be evaluated by the traditional surrogate sequence (LOCAS74) and the 
correspondent value is 1367.5K as indicated in Table 5-1. Consequently, the traditional 
deterministic safety margin is only 110.1K (1477.6 K -1367.5 K) by applying the 
DRHM methodology. Therefore, the PCT safety margin of LBLOCA evaluated by the 
RISMC methodology can be greater by 38.3 K-42.6 K than the margin evaluated by the 
DRHM deterministic methodology. It was also worth to note that by relaxing the 
bounding state assumption for traditional Appendix k methodology, the DRHM 
methodology can enlarge PCT margin by 1385.2-1367.5=17.7K, where 1385.2 K is the 
PCT evaluated by traditional Appendix K methodology with bounding state assumption, 
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and 1367.5K is the CPCT95/95 evaluated on the licensing sequence 74 with DRHM 
methodology. The evolution of PCT margin by different methodologies, traditional 
Appendix k methodology, DRHM methodology and RISMC methodology, can be 
depicted in Figure 5-17. It can be found that by relaxing the bounding state assumption 
in the DRHM methodology, the PCT margin can be enlarged by 17.7 K, while by 
relaxing the deterministic assumption in the RISMC methodology, the PCT margin can 
be further enlarged by 42.6-38.8K.  
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Table 5-1. Summary of the Top 14 Probabilistic Significant LBLOCA Sequences 
Sequence Occurrence Probability 
CPCT (K) CPCT (K) 
sequence 74 based 
CPCT (K) 
/revised  
LOCAS01 4.946E-01 1224.36 1302.36 1302.36/1322.22 
LOCAS55 4.935E-01 1229.52 1307.52 1307.52/1328.14 
LOCAS56 5.067E-03 1245.12 1323.12 1323.12/1329.22 
LOCAS91 4.522E-05 1263.21 1341.21 1341.21 
LOCAS73 1.252E-03 1264.37 1342.37 1342.37 
LOCAS02 5.087E-03 1276.48 1354.48 1354.48 
LOCAS58 1.322E-05 1278.05 1356.05 1356.05 
LOCAS19 1.070E-04 1287.59 1365.59 1365.59 
LOCAS37 4.522E-05 1289.01 1367.01 1367.01 
LOCAS74 5.460E-05 1289.46 1367.5 1367.50 
LOCAS20 5.692E-05 1293.70 1371.7 1371.7 
LOCAS04 1.322E-05 1331.42 1409.42 1409.42 
LOCAS07 2.644E-05 1429.63 1507.63 1507.63 
LOCAS61 2.644E-05 1499.76 1577.76 1577.76 
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Table 5-2. Uncertainties of Major Plant Parameters of Typical PWRs 
Parameters Distribution Min Max 
Core thermal power Uniform 101.38% 102% 
Initial average fluid 
temperature (Tavg),K 
Uniform 579.71 584.15 
Pressurizer pressure (PRCS), 
kpa 
Uniform 15168.47 15857.94 
Accumulator liquid volume 
(VACC), m3 
Uniform 27.89 28.74 
Accumulator pressure 
(PACC), kpa 
Uniform 4357.49 4688.44 
Accumulator temperature 
(TACC), K 
Uniform 310.93 338.71 
Safety injection 
temperature (TSI), 
Uniform 282.59 322.04 
Peak heat flux hot channel 
factor (FQ) 
Uniform (2.137±0.137) 
& normal (σ=2.6%) 
2.000-4σ 2.274+4σ 
Peak hot rod enthalpy rise 
hot channel factor (F△H) 
Normal (mean=1.65, 
σ=2.43%) 
Mean-4σ Mean+4σ 
Axial power distribution 
(PBOT) 
Uniform 0.22 0.44 
Axial power distribution 
(PMID) 
Uniform 0.31 0.43 
Off-site power Random Loop Non-loop 
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Table 5-3 Sampling result of major plant parameters (1/3) 
No. Power Tavg(oF) Prcs(psi) Vacc(ft3) Pacc(psi) Tacc(oF) Tsi(oF) FQ FH PBOT PMID 
Break 
type 
Break area 
(ft2) 
1 1.0169 587.5963 2206.22 1005.103 646.3588 129.5097 95.7862 2.0305 1.6957 0.3747 0.339 DECLG 8.2492 
2 1.0156 586.1147 2290.332 993.3706 638.4155 134.6662 57.8399 2.1493 1.5828 0.229 0.3806 DECLG 8.2492 
3 1.0175 591.3862 2261.072 1013.874 640.1612 112.8883 115.8528 2.1274 1.6432 0.2279 0.3263 DECLG 8.2492 
4 1.0168 589.447 2257.851 995.4742 669.0733 132.6744 112.3858 2.3355 1.6436 0.265 0.4175 DECLG 8.2492 
5 1.015 590.7064 2227.102 992.5059 674.5105 145.348 71.9687 2.2334 1.6925 0.3406 0.3931 DECLG 8.2492 
6 1.0192 587.3371 2220.506 995.1147 634.7178 146.1245 108.9548 2.2359 1.6727 0.2633 0.4246 DECLG 8.2492 
7 1.0164 587.6268 2290.656 1003.16 638.8373 147.4176 56.1347 2.0504 1.7034 0.3955 0.3496 DECLG 8.2492 
8 1.0192 585.4027 2274.324 1014.229 673.112 144.8398 62.8427 2.0999 1.606 0.2225 0.3703 DECLG 8.2492 
9 1.0151 584.4391 2240.032 991.2057 643.1967 115.7607 70.7815 2.0889 1.6712 0.4388 0.3679 DECLG 8.2492 
10 1.0175 591.7589 2238.774 998.754 640.0405 122.3518 105.1037 2.2207 1.6994 0.412 0.323 DECLG 8.2492 
11 1.014 586.5056 2224.703 1002.732 666.6141 119.131 85.6064 2.1204 1.6843 0.3297 0.3735 DECLG 8.2492 
12 1.0142 589.7196 2289.574 993.1257 667.1876 106.3211 94.7764 2.2482 1.6848 0.4024 0.3728 DECLG 8.2492 
13 1.0139 588.7747 2279.692 1013.897 645.6597 135.5572 74.9353 2.2895 1.6294 0.273 0.324 DECLG 8.2492 
14 1.0185 584.2499 2229.885 1005.16 646.0137 132.8664 68.3119 2.0903 1.6418 0.3772 0.3576 DECLG 8.2492 
15 1.0155 589.885 2207.576 1007.576 655.2908 130.8868 111.0251 2.2618 1.6163 0.258 0.3353 DECLG 8.2492 
16 1.0161 587.803 2210.246 1011.739 675.5284 100.0901 106.6688 2.2052 1.6308 0.3813 0.3737 DECLG 8.2492 
17 1.0197 589.6965 2241.536 1006.425 659.8234 109.2442 65.1874 2.0174 1.6599 0.2306 0.3596 DECLG 8.2492 
18 1.0184 585.0372 2233.636 996.8651 633.0546 107.7832 98.7053 2.0811 1.6497 0.2389 0.3751 DECLG 8.2492 
19 1.0184 591.3947 2252.093 1003.213 673.5952 143.2371 97.1074 2.0591 1.7463 0.2782 0.3668 DECLG 8.2492 
20 1.016 588.587 2262.247 988.418 667.5772 106.2253 108.9691 2.2448 1.6905 0.37 0.3688 DECLG 8.2492 
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Table 5-3 Sampling result of major plant parameters (2/3) 
No. Power Tavg(oF) Prcs(psi) Vacc(ft3) Pacc(psi) Tacc(oF) Tsi(oF) FQ FH PBOT PMID 
Break 
type 
Break area 
(ft2) 
21 1.0183 588.4564 2290.7654 1008.3694 672.1804 123.1078 71.9039 2.1354 1.6858 0.3628 0.4194 DECLG 8.2492 
22 1.015 591.3896 2207.562 987.3439 633.6742 113.5246 67.4812 2.2071 1.6112 0.2469 0.4262 DECLG 8.2492 
23 1.0168 584.7204 2267.5422 1011.8876 645.3787 128.711 82.8093 2.0737 1.7012 0.4375 0.3714 DECLG 8.2492 
24 1.0139 589.6973 2212.5981 1002.5597 669.1973 130.3917 117.103 2.1853 1.6086 0.3663 0.4165 DECLG 8.2492 
25 1.0192 590.8565 2209.2212 1010.7917 644.8517 138.5184 71.0606 2.2244 1.6476 0.2579 0.3239 DECLG 8.2492 
26 1.0166 585.4194 2297.5518 1013.2338 657.0225 127.8988 64.4309 2.3747 1.6745 0.2242 0.3737 DECLG 8.2492 
27 1.0192 589.3237 2279.9758 1007.8224 639.7548 136.8406 56.1315 2.041 1.6494 0.3247 0.3729 DECLG 8.2492 
28 1.0198 588.4827 2222.1021 1012.0129 667.72 118.5146 98.9042 2.1197 1.6605 0.2831 0.3815 DECLG 8.2492 
29 1.0176 585.1127 2276.2366 1004.2615 661.4443 114.1959 70.6952 2.1523 1.6779 0.3063 0.3664 DECLG 8.2492 
30 1.0162 584.2513 2249.4958 1011.1449 654.4634 139.1606 88.6397 2.0613 1.6324 0.3073 0.4289 DECLG 8.2492 
31 1.0163 587.8657 2280.741 993.1591 657.4806 146.2103 96.3524 1.928 1.5721 0.3177 0.3911 DECLG 8.2492 
32 1.0186 591.3221 2202.5002 1013.0596 638.3533 102.8953 57.5436 2.1742 1.6754 0.4285 0.3763 DECLG 8.2492 
33 1.0172 586.5009 2268.5908 997.931 664.7537 113.6851 101.3691 2.1802 1.6622 0.2768 0.4123 DECLG 8.2492 
34 1.0142 588.8104 2253.8679 1013.4982 652.9421 105.9717 91.6721 2.2068 1.6385 0.2856 0.3974 DECLG 8.2492 
35 1.0144 588.3864 2269.0745 996.4833 655.0034 121.7309 57.6253 1.9784 1.6054 0.2549 0.3401 DECLG 8.2492 
36 1.0147 587.6184 2284.2449 1010.6799 635.8043 108.6544 107.9216 1.9951 1.7061 0.4164 0.3539 DECLG 8.2492 
37 1.0182 589.1495 2275.6848 1012.7617 639.1672 107.3295 65.4206 2.1047 1.6708 0.2781 0.3762 DECLG 8.2492 
38 1.0155 583.8067 2255.6101 986.692 641.2699 128.3677 111.7968 2.1454 1.6523 0.3769 0.3597 DECLG 8.2492 
39 1.0172 591.6923 2271.1099 986.7904 677.4421 117.6094 69.8319 2.1644 1.6842 0.2856 0.428 DECLG 8.2492 
40 1.0145 591.0203 2229.0779 1007.8519 636.0159 144.7528 84.1107 2.1266 1.6961 0.3264 0.3263 DECLG 8.2492 
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Table 5-3 Sampling result of major plant parameters (3/3) 
No. Power Tavg(oF) Prcs(psi) Vacc(ft3) Pacc(psi) Tacc(oF) Tsi(oF) FQ FH PBOT PMID 
Break 
type 
Break area 
(ft2) 
41 1.0153 587.5408 2295.0288 1005.1652 668.2175 128.045 93.0676 2.1375 1.6182 0.4311 0.3805 DECLG 8.2492 
42 1.0182 585.0449 2207.8301 989.7984 672.8804 111.7549 80.4071 2.0634 1.6529 0.3149 0.3343 DECLG 8.2492 
43 1.015 589.5508 2283.4583 1012.7112 636.7563 138.367 96.7894 2.2453 1.6551 0.4086 0.3632 DECLG 8.2492 
44 1.015 585.9604 2254.1921 1004.2035 678.7186 129.8304 49.352 2.1466 1.6259 0.2587 0.3935 DECLG 8.2492 
45 1.0167 583.8482 2274.4849 988.8352 668.3654 120.5071 103.9573 2.1832 1.6737 0.3691 0.3371 DECLG 8.2492 
46 1.0167 590.0641 2204.9866 1005.6825 634.0316 127.5935 103.8502 2.2273 1.6428 0.3391 0.3164 DECLG 8.2492 
47 1.0182 584.6722 2271.6912 987.3613 661.8533 128.8962 94.6552 2.0276 1.6937 0.4152 0.3649 DECLG 8.2492 
48 1.0141 587.726 2265.1018 994.8865 668.8404 133.6242 65.3268 2.0425 1.6207 0.2977 0.3463 DECLG 8.2492 
49 1.0196 587.5303 2224.9912 1014.5881 663.5226 141.7063 86.3679 2.2155 1.6071 0.3471 0.4048 DECLG 8.2492 
50 1.0156 587.6816 2208.2803 992.1831 669.7471 116.2731 75.9711 1.9611 1.637 0.3006 0.3804 DECLG 8.2492 
51 1.0189 589.0216 2216.2361 997.7368 676.334 123.1817 67.5152 2.2805 1.615 0.3384 0.3749 DECLG 8.2492 
52 1.015 588.0416 2288.8535 1005.5166 659.1129 134.4682 113.2772 2.1687 1.6588 0.269 0.333 DECLG 8.2492 
53 1.018 585.6785 2234.0076 1003.4197 671.3772 106.8327 89.4246 2.1986 1.6194 0.3165 0.3984 DECLG 8.2492 
54 1.0144 587.4326 2244.6465 994.8892 645.8608 122.4561 78.5097 2.0028 1.6355 0.2971 0.3495 DECLG 8.2492 
55 1.0193 587.8782 2281.2744 992.9033 650.85 123.9796 53.9661 2.1058 1.5899 0.2228 0.3718 DECLG 8.2492 
56 1.0181 586.6215 2204.4404 993.2461 678.3618 130.678 75.7681 2.237 1.6574 0.3221 0.357 DECLG 8.2492 
57 1.0162 588.4556 2241.9468 1013.7851 640.233 109.9856 63.5129 1.9813 1.6654 0.3561 0.333 DECLG 8.2492 
58 1.0159 588.8334 2224.1868 987.2167 633.4017 115.0645 58.2151 1.9279 1.6716 0.3527 0.4049 DECLG 8.2492 
59 1.0185 586.2753 2200.1514 995.7124 642.4063 121.7193 82.3877 2.3987 1.6593 0.3207 0.3131 DECLG 8.2492 
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Table 5-4 59 PCT(K) of Sequence 74 
1023.821 1203.56 1241.282 1276.127 1299.377 
1064.06 1204.493 1244.877 1282.166 1302.127 
1092.049 1208.071 1253.749 1282.399 1303.438 
1100.049 1211.382 1257.827 1283.854 1303.682 
1113.899 1212.071 1265.604 1286.427 1307.588 
1153.482 1213.677 1266.799 1287.382 1313.493 
1158.627 1227.438 1267.238 1287.938 1319.771 
1160.688 1227.471 1268.327 1291.049 1330.071 
1162.371 1232.027 1273.716 1292.204 1337.827 
1178.777 1236.154 1273.882 1292.232 1341.66 
1187.404 1239.66 1275.532 1298.077 1367.499 
1189.482 1241.104 1275.627 1299.066  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5-5 Summary of Target Sequence Difference 
Sequence 
ID 
Sequence 
probability 
Loss of  
off-site  
power 
High Head 
Injection 
ACC 
Injection 
Low 
Pressure 
Injection 
LOCAS01 4.946E-01 no 2 trains 3 2 trains 
LOCAS55 4.935E-01 yes 2 trains 3 2 trains 
LOCAS56 5.067E-03 yes 1 trains 3 2 train 
LOCAS74 5.460E-05 yes 1 train 3 1 train 
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Table 5-6 59 PCT(k) of Sequence 1 
1047.85 1160.888 1196.827 1229.566 1270.743 
1106.97 1164.216 1201.682 1236.638 1272.81 
1114.25 1167.621 1206.843 1238.038 1273.01 
1125.1 1171.06 1206.954 1238.749 1273.582 
1131.15 1182.632 1210.632 1242.277 1278.254 
1133.68 1184.066 1213.16 1250.577 1281.704 
1134.41 1184.466 1214.299 1252.999 1293.393 
1143.88 1185.921 1215.432 1255.91 1296.499 
1149.17 1192.193 1223.521 1256.527 1305.116 
1151.1 1193.138 1223.754 1262.127 1313.66 
1152.42 1193.56 1224.954 1266.782 1322.238 
1156.48 1195.943 1229.116 1267.06  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5-7 59 PCT(k) of Sequence 55 
1018.91 1160.516 1212.143 1237.91 1282.36 
1051.888 1166.016 1220.732 1239.599 1290.199 
1066.238 1166.749 1220.799 1243.36 1294.138 
1076.56 1170.138 1221.849 1248.482 1295.754 
1082.532 1175.36 1226.393 1252.304 1299.01 
1104.182 1178.827 1228.466 1256.16 1306.321 
1106.543 1189.393 1229.254 1256.743 1306.349 
1113.06 1190.966 1231.627 1265.254 1309.332 
1146.538 1195.049 1232.899 1265.443 1309.543 
1152.521 1195.188 1233.727 1277.521 1317.504 
1159.093 1209.054 1235.243 1278.521 1328.154 
1160.288 1211.821 1235.477 1280.554  
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Table 5-8 59 PCT(k) of Sequence 56 
1018.91 1152.027 1193.36 1214.916 1259.316 
1038.46 1159.049 1193.466 1218.793 1259.538 
1051.888 1164.904 1194.96 1223.221 1259.582 
1069.982 1165.249 1198.338 1225.277 1260.027 
1077.016 1165.382 1199.188 1225.877 1262.171 
1082.532 1166.016 1199.577 1226.332 1276.793 
1085.038 1171.56 1201.299 1230.46 1284.916 
1127.421 1177.571 1203.993 1232.582 1286.304 
1137.416 1182.627 1207.677 1236.16 1305.582 
1140.471 1182.738 1211.327 1237.743 1325.121 
1140.938 1187.593 1211.838 1247.654 1329.227 
1149.821 1188.732 1212.282 1252.143  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5-9 Comparison of Calculational Uncertainty of Each Sequence 
Sequence PCT PCT95/95 PCT 
1 1224.4 1322.22 97.89 
55 1229.5 1328.14 98.62 
56 1245.1 1329.22 84.10 
74 1289.5 1367.50 78.0 
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Figure 5-1 Heading of LBLOCA event tree   
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-2 Fault tree result for High Head Safety Injection (HHSI)  
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Figure 5-3 Fault tree result for Low Head Safety Injection (LHSI) 
 
Figure 5-4 Fault tree result for accumulator system  
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Figure 5-5 Sequence Identification and Quantification for LBLOCA 
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Figure 5-6 RELAP5 Nodding Diagram for Maanshan PWR LBLOCA Analysis 
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Figure 5-7 Responses for the Probabilistic Significant LBOCA Events 
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Figure 5-8 Preliminary Load Spectrum for Maanshan PWR LBLOCA 
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Figure 5-9 59 PCT Plots of Sequence-74 
 
 
Figure 5-10 PCT scattering Plot of Sequence-74 
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Figure 5-11 PCT scattering Plot of Sequence-1 
 
 
Figure 5-12 PCT scattering Plot of Sequence-55 
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Figure 5-13 PCT scattering Plot of Sequence-56 
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Figure 5-14 59 PCT Plots of Sequence-1 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-15 59 PCT Plots of Sequence-55  
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Figure 5-16 59 PCT Plots of Sequence-56 
 
 
 
Figure 5-17 Evolution of PCT Margin 
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Chapter 6. Evolution of Licensing Methodology for the Large Break 
Loss of Coolant Accident Analysis and Associated PCT Margin 
Quantification 
In this chapter, the evolution from a deterministic methodology to a risk-informed 
methodology for LBLOCA analysis was elaborated, and the PCT margin quantified by 
associated methodologies was compered. Among the deterministic methodologies, the 
traditional Appendix K methodology and the deterministic-realistic hybrid 
methodology (DRHM) (Liang, 2011) were involved in this paper；DRHM methodology 
is a BEPU methodology of partial scope. In the traditional Appendix K methodology, 
both conservative appendix K models and conservative plant status parameters would 
be applied. While in the DRHM methodology, physical models required by Appendix 
K were still adopted to ensure model conservatism, whereas realistic plant status 
parameters were used with statistical uncertainty analysis. As for the risk-informed 
methodology, the newly developed risk-informed safety margin characteristic (RISMC) 
methodology (Hess, 2009) (Smith, 2012) (Sherry, 2013) was applied with a proper E.M. 
model to generate a probabilistic load spectrum and to calculate the risk-informed PCT 
margin for LBLOCA to satisfy the to-be-issued 10 CFR 50.46a. To make the PCT 
margin comparison meaningful enough, the E.M. model applied for above 
methodologies all utilized RELAP5-3D/K (Liang, 2002a, 2002b), an Appendix K 
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version of RELAP5-3D (Jonson, 1998). To calculate the PCT of a LBLOCA with 
RELAP5-3D/K, three distinguished phases are involved, namely blowdown, refill and 
reflood, and during each phase associated Appendix K requirements are all satisfied. 
 
6.1 Deterministic Methodology  
According to the existing 10 CFR 50.46, the LBLOCA can only be analyzed by 
deterministic licensing methodologies with E.M. models based on a surrogate sequence 
which satisfies all the required licensing assumptions. The associated procedure that 
guides the development of the E.M. models for transient and accident analyses provided 
by USNRC was thoroughly stated in Regulatory Guide 1.203 (USNRC, 2005). In the 
design-basis LBLOCA licensing analysis, the revised 10 CFR 50.46 in 1988 indicates 
that two kinds of E.M. models are accepted, namely conservative E.M. models 
developed in conformance with the required and acceptable features of Appendix K of 
10 CFR 50, and realistic E.M. models with uncertainty quantification. As stated in the 
revised 10 CFR 50.46, an alternative ECCS performance, based on best estimate 
method, may be used to provide more realistic estimates of plant safety margins, 
provided the licensee quantifies the uncertainty of the estimates and includes the 
uncertainty when comparing the calculated results with prescribed acceptance limits. It 
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was well recognized that a realistic LOCA analysis with uncertainty quantification can 
generate a greater safety margin than the traditional conservative LOCA analysis using 
Appendix K evaluation models. 
 
Traditional Appendix K methodology calculation 
To perform a traditional Appendix K LBLOCA licensing analysis, a system code 
of the Appendix K version shall be applied and bounding plant parameters shall be 
assumed. To demonstrate a traditional appendix K LBLOCA analysis, Taiwan’s 
Maanshan nuclear power plant, which is a Westinghouse three-loop PWR plant, was 
analyzed with an Appendix K version of RELAP5-3D (RELAP5-3D/K). Besides, 
bounding plant parameters were also assumed and summarized in Table 2-2 marked by 
“*”. Other than those assumed bounding plant parameters, to maximize the steam 
binding effect constant atmospheric containment pressure was also conservatively 
assumed. A typical cladding temperature response is shown in Figure 6-1. It can be 
seen that the resultant licensing PCT is 1385.2 K (Taiwan Power Company, 2013) with 
an associated PCT margin of 92.4 K. Generally, the PCT margin evaluated by the 
traditional Appendix K methodology should be much less than that analyzed by the 
BEPU methodology, as shown in Figure 6-2. 
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Best-estimate plus uncertainty quantification methodology (BEPU) calculation 
Generally, the PCT margin evaluated by the BEPU methodology should be much 
greater than that analyzed by the traditional Appendix K methodology, as shown in 
Figure 6-2. Comparing the new licensing PCT (1179.25 K) (Westinghouse, 2009) of 
the Taiwan Maanshan plant evaluated by the Westinghouse full-ranged ASTRUM best-
estimate LBLOCA methodology with the WCOBRA/TRAC code (Westinghouse, 
2005), and the previous licensing PCT (1383.8 K) (Westinghouse, 1987) evaluated by 
the Westinghouse Appendix K methodology with BASH code (Westinghouse, 1981), 
it can be observed that margin released from the traditional appendix K approach versus 
the full-ranged BELOCA methodology can be 204.6 K.  
 
Deterministic-realistic hybrid methodology (DRHM) calculation 
To perform the Maanshan LBLOCA licensing analysis with DRHM methodology 
using RELAP5-3D/K, 59 trails are generated by random sampling of the major plant 
parameters listed in Table 2-2. The resultant PCT of each trial is shown in Figure 5-9. 
It was noted that the greatest PCT among 59 sets is 1367.5 K. Regarding the parametric 
approach, it was found that normal distribution was rejected by the goodness-of-fitting 
test. Therefore, the PCT95/95 can only be estimated by order statistic method； 
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  KiPCTMaxPCTPCT
iorder
5.136759,1,
95/95
                   (6-1) 
and the associated PCT margin is 110.1 K (1477.6-1367.5 K). Comparing with the PCT 
margin (92.4K=1477.6-1385.2) evaluated by the traditional Appendix K bounding state 
approach, it can be observed that only by relaxing bounding plant parameter settings, 
extra margin can be generated by 17.7 K (110.1-92.4 K) as shown in Figure 6-3, which 
is about 1/10 of the margin released by a full-scoped BEPU methodology covering the 
uncertainties of both physical model and plant status. 
 
6.2 Risk-informed methodology 
Regarding the risk-informed methodology for beyond design-basis LBLOCA 
analysis, two kinds of uncertainties need to be addressed, namely epistemic uncertainty 
and aleatory uncertainty. Epistemic uncertainty results from the “imperfect knowledge” 
regarding values of parameters of the underlying computational model, whereas 
aleatory uncertainty results from the effect of “inherent randomness” or “stochastic 
variability”. Aleatory uncertainty represents the nondeterministic and unpredictable 
random nature of the performance of the system and its components. Epistemic 
uncertainty generally can be refereed as calculation uncertainty. In the current advanced 
BEPU licensing safety analysis methodologies (Westinghouse, 2005) (Martin, R.P., 
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2005) (Framatome ANP, 2001), only epistemic uncertainty is considered on a particular 
surrogate sequence which satisfies all the required licensing assumptions. To deal with 
the aleatory uncertainty, a group of sequences should be identified for a particular 
initiating event with PSA skill to take into account systems or components failure by 
random probability.  
The RISMC methodology is a systematic approach that considers both aleatory 
and epistemic uncertainties. To replace the surrogate-based decision making, the main 
scope of the RISMC methodology is to generate a probabilistic load spectrum as shown 
in Figure 1-2, and to quantify the safety margin in a proper risk-informed manner. The 
RISMC methodology can systematically combine both probabilistic and mechanistic 
approaches to estimate the safety margin. The probability analysis is represented by the 
stochastic risk analysis with PSA techniques involving both event tree and fault tree 
analysis, whereas mechanistic analysis is represented by the physical calculation with 
evaluation models satisfying the requirements set forth in the to-be-issued 10 CFR 
50.46. Evaluation models can either be a conservative Appendix K model or a realistic 
model with uncertainty quantification. With the combination of probabilistic and 
mechanistic analyses, both aleatory uncertainty and epistemic uncertainty can be well 
quantitatively addressed, and a risk-informed PCT margin of LBLOCA can be 
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evaluated. 
The following process was recommended (Liang, 2016) to calculate the licensing 
PCT of a LBLOCA to satisfy the risk-informed safety margin evaluation requirement 
stated in the to-be-issued 10 CFR 50.46a. The associated seven steps are shown in 
Figure 8 and elaborated as follows； 
(1) Identification of the LBLOCA sequences； 
(2) Quantification of LBLOCA sequence occurrence probabilities； 
(3) Calculation of the nominal PCT for LBLOCA sequences； 
(4) Conducting a preliminary load spectrum of LBLOCA； 
(5) Quantification of the calculation uncertainty of the preliminary load spectrum； 
(6) Conducting the final load spectrum for LBLOCA； and 
(7) The Risk-informed PCT Safety Margin Characterization. 
Detailed elaboration of each step was stated in Chapter 4 and the application of the 
RISMC methodology to evaluate the risk-informed PCT of LBLOCA of the Maanshan 
plant was presented in Chapter 5. The final load spectrum for LBLOCA of the 
Maanshan plant is indicated in the last column of Table 5-1. 
The risk-informed PCT safety margin (PCTRI) can be calculated by two different 
methods； the first one is the expecting value estimation method (equation 4-4) and 
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the second one is the sequence probability coverage method (equation 4-5). By using 
the first expecting value estimation method and data listed in Table 5-1, the risk-
informed safety margin can be mathematically calculated according to Equation (4-4) 
as follows； 
i
i
iMRRI
SPPCTPCT   *,                                    (6-2) 
        = 152.72 K 
As for the second sequence probability coverage method, it was found that the 
summation of the first 3 sequence (LOCAS01, LOCAS55 and LOCAS56) probabilities 
is 99.3%. Therefore, the third sequence with a value of 1329.22 K will be applied to 
define the risk-informed PCTRI
99%, and the risk-informed safety margin will be as 
follows 
%99
RI
PCTPCTPCT
SLRI

                                      (6-3) 
         = 148.38 K 
Comparing the risk-informed safety margins evaluated by above two methods, it can 
be found that the PCTRI calculated by the sequence probability coverage method is 
reasonably conservative by 4.34 K. It was also noted that according to the deterministic 
methodology, the licensing PCT can only be evaluated by the traditional surrogate 
sequence (LOCAS74) and the correspondent value is 1367.5K as indicated in Table 5-
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1. Consequently, the traditional deterministic safety margin is only 110.1K (1477.6 K-
1367.5 K) by applying the DRHM methodology. Therefore, the PCT safety margin of 
LBLOCA evaluated by the RISMC methodology can be greater by 38.3 K-42.6 K than 
the margin evaluated by the DRHM deterministic methodology. 
 
6.3 PCT margin evolution 
As indicated in this chapter, PCT margins of LBLOCA can only be evaluated 
either by deterministic methodologies or risk-informed methodology. Regarding the 
deterministic methodologies, only epistemic uncertainty was considered, which 
majorly involves model uncertainty and plant status uncertainty. While for the risk-
informed methodology, both the epistemic and aleatory uncertainties are all properly 
considered. In the traditional Appendix K deterministic methodology, both model 
uncertainty and plant status uncertainty are all conservatively treated. While for the 
DRHM deterministic methodology, although the conservative Appendix K models 
were still applied, realistic plant status parameters were adopted with statistical 
uncertainty quantification. As for the BEPU deterministic methodology, full scoped 
realistic LBLOCA analysis can be performed with statistical treatment of both model 
uncertainties and plant status uncertainties. Treatments of uncertainties by above 
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methodologies are summarized in Table 6-1 for comparison. It is generally truly that 
the more conservative the methodology is the smaller margin can be generated. It is 
expected that amount those deterministic methodologies, the greatest margin can be 
generated by a full-scoped BEPU methodology, while smallest margin can be available 
when applying a traditional Appendix K methodology, with DRHM’s margin lying in 
between. Furthermore, when applying a same evaluation model to perform LBLOCA 
analysis, the margin evaluated by the risk-informed methodology is expected to be 
greater than the margin generated from deterministic methodologies.  
As indicated in this chapter, PCT margins of LBLOCA were evaluated by different 
methodologies with RELAP5-3D/K for Taiwan’s Maanshan nuclear power plant. 
Regarding the deterministic methodologies, the PCT margin shall be evaluated based 
on the licensing sequence, and demonstrated methodologies include the traditional 
Appendix K methodology and the DRHM methodology. For the traditional Appendix 
K methodology, the conservative Appendix K code (RELAP5-3D/K) was adopted and 
conservative plant parameters were assumed to define a plant bounding status. The PCT 
margin evaluated by the traditional Appendix K methodology was 92.4 K, as shown in 
Figure 5-17. As for the DRHM methodology, it is a BEPU methodology of partial scope. 
In the DRHM methodology, physical models required by Appendix K were still 
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adopted to ensure model conservatism, whereas realistic plant status parameters were 
used with statistical uncertainty analysis. The PCT margin evaluated by the DRHM 
methodology for the Maanshan plant is 110.1K (1477.6-1367.5K). An additional 17.1K 
(110.1K-92.4K) margin can be released only by relaxing the plant bounding state 
assumption with realistic plant parameters. As demonstrated by the Westinghouse in 
the LBLOCA licensing analysis of Taiwan’s Maanshan plant, a full-scoped BEPU 
methodology with best-estimate models and realistic plant parameters can release PCT 
margin by about 204.6 K from traditional Appendix K approach (Westinghouse,2009) 
(Westinghouse,1987). 
According to the current licensing rules, LBLOCA can only be evaluated by 
deterministic methodologies, unless the LBLOCA can be re-categorized as a beyond 
DBA event by the to-be-issued 10 CFR50.46a. For the non-design-basis LBLOCA, the 
risk-informed methodology can be applied to account the contribution of the PCT 
margin from all success LBLOCA sequences. As indicated by the risk-informed PCT 
evaluation in chapter 4, 14 probabilistic dominant sequences and associated occurrence 
probabilities have been identified and quantified. Consequently, the resultant risk-
informed PCT margin can be 148.4-152.7 K by using RELAP5-3D/K. It then can be 
noted that the additional PCT margin of 38.3-42.6 K can be released from the 
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deterministic DRHM methodology by relaxing the licensing sequence assumptions.  
In summary, the PCT margin of LBLOCA evaluated by a traditional appendix K 
methodology (PCTAPK) can be further enlarged by 17.7K when applying the DRHM 
methodology to relax the assumption of bounding plant status by realistic plant 
parameters and statistical analysis. While when applying a full-scoped BEPU 
methodology covering both best-estimate models and realistic plant parameters with 
statistical uncertainty analysis, the PCTAPK can be enlarged by 204.6 K. Furthermore, 
when applying RISMC to relax the licensing sequence assumption and perform the risk-
informed LBLOCA analysis, the PCT margin evaluated by deterministic DRHM 
methodology can be further enlarged by 38.3-42.6 K. The PCT margin evolution from 
different methodologies is summarized in Table 6-2. 
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Table 6-1. Summary of Uncertainty Treatment for Different Methodologies 
 
 Epistemic uncertainty Aleatory 
uncertainty Models Plant status 
Deterministic 
methodology 
Appendix K conservative 
treatment 
conservative 
treatment 
Not included 
DRHM conservative 
treatment 
Statistical 
treatment 
Not included 
BEPU Statistical 
treatment 
Statistical 
treatment 
Not included 
Risk-informed 
methodology 
Properly treated Properly treated 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6-2. PCT Margin Evolution from the Traditional Appendix K Methodology 
 
Relaxation of 
bounding plant 
status(DRHM) 
Realistic physical 
models and plant 
parameters (BEPU) 
Relaxation of licensing 
sequence assumption 
(RISMC) 
PCTMR Enlarged 17.7 K 204.6 K 56.0-60.3 K 
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Figure 6-1. PCT Calculated by the Traditional Appendix K Methodology (Taiwan 
Power Company, 2013) 
 
 
 
Figure 6-2. PCT Margin Evaluated by Appendix K and BEPU Deterministic 
Approaches 
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Figure 6-3. Comparison of PCTs from both DRHM and Appendix K Bounding State 
Analysis for Maanshan Plant 
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Chapter 7. Conclusions 
According to the existing 10 CFR 50.46, both SBLOCA and LBLOCA are 
categorized as essential design basis accidents, and only deterministic methodologies 
can be applied to quantify the PCT safety margin based on a surrogate sequence, which 
satisfies all the required licensing assumptions. However, in the to-be-issued 10 CR 
50.46a the LBLOCA can be regarded as a beyond design-basis accident, and the PCT 
margin shall be evaluated with a risk-informed methodology. To evaluate the risk-
informed LBLOCA PCT margin, not only the traditional licensing sequence, but also 
the contributions of all other success LBLOCA sequences are considered in a proper 
risk-informed manner. Regarding the features of deterministic and risk-informed 
LBLOCA licensing methodologies and the associated PCT margin quantification, the 
following statements can be concluded； 
(1) In the deterministic methodologies required for design-basis LBLOCA analysis, 
only epistemic or calculation uncertainty is addressed by either the conservative 
appendix K approach or the BEPU approach. Calculation uncertainty generally 
consists of physical model uncertainty and plant status uncertainty； 
(2) In the risk-informed methodology, not only the epistemic uncertainty but also the 
aleatory are addressed by conducting a PCT load spectrum of LBLOCA. The 
PCT load spectrum showed that the conditional PCT generally ascends with the 
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descending sequence occurrence probability； 
(3) all possible LBLOCA sequences have been conducted by applying traditional 
PSA technology, 14 probabilistic dominant sequences have been identified and 
associated occurrence probabilities also have been quantified； 
(4) a load spectrum for LBLOCA has been conducted by calculating conditional 
PCT of each probabilistic significant sequence with proper LOCA evaluation 
models. Generally, the conditional PCT ascends with the descending sequence 
occurrence probability. In this load spectrum both aleatory and epistemic 
uncertainties have been considered； 
(5) with the load spectrum, the risk-informed PCT can be evaluated by either the 
expecting value estimation method or the sequence probability coverage 
method；  
(6) In the risk-informed methodology, to have a cumulated occurrence probability 
over 99% in the load spectrum, the third sequence by the order of ascending PCT 
was referred and the associated sequence occurrence probability is 5.07*10-3. 
While in the deterministic methodology, the occurrence probability of the 
traditional surrogate or licensing sequence is only 5.46*10-5； 
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(7) Regarding the deterministic LBLOCA methodologies, the PCT margin quantified 
by the traditional Appendix K bounding state methodology with RELAP5-3D/K 
code can be enlarged by 17.7 K using the DRHM methodology, in which realistic 
plant parameters and statistical uncertainty analysis are utilized. It was noted that 
the PCT margin released from bounding state assumption is about 1/10 of the 
margin released by a full-scoped BEPU methodology； 
(8) By relaxing the licensing sequence assumption, an additional LBLOCA PCT 
margin of 38.3-42.6 K can be released from the deterministic DRHM approach 
by applying the risk-informed safety margin characterization (RISMC) 
methodology to consider the contribution of PCT margin from all success 
LBLOCA sequences； 
(9) It is expected that amount deterministic methodologies, the greatest margin can 
be generated by a full-scoped BEPU methodology, while smallest margin can be 
available when applying a traditional Appendix K methodology, with DRHM’s 
margin lying in between；  
(10) When applying a same evaluation model to perform LBLOCA analysis, the 
margin evaluated by the risk-informed methodology is expected to be greater 
than the margin generated from deterministic methodologies； 
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(11) Finally, the safety margin of LBLOCA can be released from traditional Appendix 
K methodology by (i) relaxing plant bounding state assumption (DRHM 
methodology), (ii) performing realistic LOCA analysis with statistical 
consideration of both model uncertainties and plant status uncertainties (BEPU 
methodology), and (iii) relaxing licensing sequence assumption and evaluating 
the PCT margin in a proper risk-informed manner (RISMC methodology). 
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